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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Our well being and the productivity of the economy depend on noru-enewable 
natural resources, that is, resources which are in the class of non-produced goods, like 
land: their natural rate of growth is zero. Unlike land, however, exhaustible resources 
are depleted when used as inputs in production, because the amount of services that can 
be obtained from them is finite (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). 
In this dissertation, I analyze economic issues related to the use of one of these 
resources: susceptibility to a chemical compound. There are various types of compounds 
used to control susceptible targets. Here, the focus will be on two types: agricultural 
pesticides and antibiotics. Through natural selection, continuous utilization of the 
chemical compound increases the frequency of the genes resistant to the active 
ingredients of the pesticide or drug in the target population, and it decreases the available 
biological capital of genetic susceptibility'. 
Two issues are particularly important in the determination of the optimal use of 
these resources: the common property nature of susceptibility and technological change. 
The nonrenewable characteristic is partly a function of technological change. Probably 
the most visible example is given by oil. The stock of oil is a limited quantity, but the 
number of oil deposits available increases as extraction technology improves. Moreover, 
' If the resistant target organism is less fit, that is, has higher mortality or lower reproductive rates than the 
average organism, the depletion of susceptibility may not only be slowed down or halted, but even 
reversed. In such a case, susceptibility is better seen as a renewable resource. Here we will focus on the 
resistant organisms' fitness being identical to that of susceptible ones. 
2 
technological change allows the substitution of a resource with another, that can be either 
exhaustible or renewable. For instance, natural gas and solar energy, which is in 
unlimited supply, can substitute for oil. 
Clearly, if backstop technologies are discovered at a sustained pace and the 
returns to research are high, biological susceptibility to an existing substance is not a very 
valuable good. If, on the other hand, the outcomes of the innovative process are 
uncertain and research requires substantial investments, the pesticides and drugs we have 
should be used more sparingly to prolong their life span. Also, if all the active 
ingredients being discovered are similar to each other, in that they have a similar mode of 
action, it is likely that resistance to a chemical will result in reduced susceptibility to 
another one. Such cross-resistance is a problem for both antibiotics and pesticides, where 
the classical example of cross-resistance is the case of resistance to DDT. One of the 
genes conferring resistance to DDT, kdr, also gives resistance against pyrethroids 
(Georghiou). Multi-drug resistance is widespread because bacteria have various 
mechanisms to exchange the genetic material that makes them resistant (Levy 1992). For 
example, if the bacterium Hemophilus influenzae, which causes ear infections, meningitis 
and pneumonia, develops resistance to penicillin, it can transmit this resistance to 
Escherichia coli. Thus, bacteria never directly exposed to any antibiotic can still possess 
resistance genes. 
Common property issues are key to understanding resistance because the 
individual contribution to the buildup of resistance is generally very low. Moreover, both 
pests and bacteria are mobile, so first-best behavior today does not guarantee successful 
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outcomes of the pesticide application or the drug therapy in the future. For both these 
reasons, decentralized solutions to the problem of optimal use of pesticides/drugs are 
likely to be suboptimal. 
Genetic susceptibility to pesticides has been long been identified in the economic 
literature as an exhaustible resource (Taylor and Hadley, and Hueth and Regev). On the 
other hand, the problem of resistance to antibiotics has attracted less attention in 
economics until recently (see Brown and Layton, and Laxminarayan and Brown). Recent 
events have increased the importance of determining optimal use of existing substances 
in the case of both pesticides and antibiotics. 
For pesticides, an important event that has brought the issue of resistance 
management to the forefront of the policy debate has been the successful introduction of 
plants genetically engineered to produce toxins which kill pests. The first generation of 
these products uses toxins produced by a bacterium. Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt). The 
rapid expansion of these products poses important policy questions on how to utilize 
these new resources so that resistance buildup is limited. For instance, according to the 
Third Biennial National Organic Farmers' Survey conducted by the Organic Farming 
Research Foundation (OFRF), Bt sprays are the most important external input used by 
organic farmers for pest management. Moreover, Bt sprays are used on over half of the 
US production of crops such as celery, cabbage and fresh tomatoes (USDA, 1999a). 
There is a concern that the heavy use of Bt toxins produced by the plant pesticides will 
cause resistance to develop, thereby depriving farmers of the possibility to use Bt sprays 
(EPA, 1998a). In order to preserve susceptibility, the EPA has mandated the use of 
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refuges, untreated portions of the field in which insects susceptible to Bt can survive, so 
that their mating with resistant pests can slow down the mining of susceptibility. 
In the case of antibiotics, the problem of resistance is more dramatic for two 
reasons. The first is that the failure of a drug to treat an illness has more serious 
consequences than crop failure; The second reason is that antibiotic discoveries were 
concentrated in the 1940s and 1950s (Kingston). Only t\vo new classes have been 
discovered since them, and the newest class, the oxazolidinones, is still not commercially 
available (Diekema and Jones). 
Here is a brief synopsis of the chapters that follow. Chapter II consists of a 
general theoretical model of resistance development that explicitly incorporates a spatial 
dimension. When determining pesticide applications and their impact on the development 
of resistance, decision makers have two control variables at their disposal: one is how 
much chemical to use in a given portion of the region, and the other is the percentage of 
the total region over which to apply the chemical, or the refuge size. The use of refuges 
is not a novel idea (see for instance Georghiou and Taylor, 1977), but it is receiving more 
attention recently because of the EPA's policy towards Bt crops. The explicit presence of 
a spatial element in the model allows us to examine the impact of pest mobility on the 
common property nature of susceptibility and its effects on refuge. The inclusion of pest 
mobility is also instrumental in specifying the conditions in which eradication policies 
may be successful. Should eradication not be a feasible option, the model includes a 
salvage function for the pest population and the susceptibility to the pesticide. This 
allows us to discuss the role of cross-resistance in determining pest management policies. 
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Chapter HI presents an empirical analysis of the consequences of pest mobility on 
the development of resistance in the context of Bt com. The model takes into account the 
existence of mandatory (structured) refuges for farmers planting Bt crops and analyzes 
the impact of incomplete market penetration on resistance development and profits. If 
part of the crop production area is seeded with traditional, non-bioengineered seed, these 
fields act as an unstructured refuge. The current EPA policy is effectively based on a 
100% market penetration. Given the reluctance of the European Union to accept 
agricultural products containing bio-engineered material, it is possible that market 
penetration could stagnate. In such an instance, the presence of a spatial component 
allows an explicit evaluation of the role of structured and unstructured refuges and their 
costs. 
Chapter IV concentrates on the optimal use of existing antibiotics and on the 
optimal time path of investment in the development of new technologies. The 
intertemporal allocation of susceptibility and the development of alternative technologies 
are important social issues, particularly in the case of pharmaceutical products, because 
health can be considered a necessary good. The analysis focuses on three scenarios. In 
the first, no technological change is possible, so the existing antibiotic is the only one that 
will ever be available. In the next two scenarios, endogenous technological change is 
introduced. First, discovery is in the form of the certain (costly) introduction of another 
antibiotic that still depends on the presence of susceptible targets. In the second case, 
innovation produces a novel technology, based on a renewable resource. Since this 
6 
backstop is an entirely novel technology, however, there is uncertainty on when it will 
become available. 
Finally, in Chapter V, I present some general conclusions and discuss the 
importance of externalities and of technological change in the optimal depletion of 
genetic susceptibility. 
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CHAPTER 11. 
A SPATIOTEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF PESTICIDE USE 
AND RESISTANCE DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
This chapter extends the literature on nonrenewable resources by analyzing the 
management of an agricultural pest population through a pesticide which promotes 
resistance when spatial refuges are used to prolong the pesticide's efficacy. Suppose that, 
in a given crop production region, a decision-maker has to choose the quantity of 
chemical input (pesticide) to use. The optimal amount of pesticide applied depends on 
two factors. The first is that a higher usage of the input, while it reduces today's pest 
population, also causes resistance to develop in the future, thereby reducing efficacy in 
the long run. The second factor is the mobility of the pest population. Weeds, fungi and 
insects are all mobile, so mobility is potentially important to many pests. The movement 
of pests from field to field may help counter the natural selection process that gives rise 
to the development of resistance because this movement affects the genetic make-up of 
the pest population and will affect the evolution of resistance. Therefore, a decision 
maker concerned with the long term efficacy of the pesticide has two control variables at 
her disposal: how much chemical to use in a given portion of the region, and the 
percentage of the total region in which the chemical is applied. Thus, the optimal 
exhaustion path of pesticide susceptibility has both temporal and spatial dimensions. 
Previous studies (Hueth and Regev, Taylor and Hadley, Regev et ai, Lazarus and 
Dixon, Clark and Carlson and Gorddard et al.) have concentrated on the pesticide dose as 
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the only control variable, and have not considered how pest mobility over space affects 
the dynamic path of resistance. Specifically, Hueth and Regev analyze resistance 
development within one season, and do not include a spatial element'. Taylor and 
Hadley develop an explicit genetic model of resistance inheritance which produces a 
resistance path similar to the one used in this paper (see Hartl and Clark). Regev et al, 
1983, Lazarus and Dixon and Clark and Carlson illustrate the possible problems deriving 
from the common property nature of pests. Gorddard et al. focus on weeds, and on the 
integration of chemical and non-chemical control to slow down resistance development. 
The value of susceptibility to a pesticide is higher if the pest causes considerable 
crop damage, or if backstop technologies are not discovered frequently. In addition, 
delaying resistance is valuable if cross resistance is a potential problem. 
Cross resistance occurs if the active chemical element present in the pesticide has 
a mode of action that overlaps with that of another existing or yet to be invented 
pesticide. The presence of cross resistance means that susceptibility has a positive value 
even after the backstop technology is introduced. Clearly, it is not possible to attribute a 
general value to cross resistance, as each pesticide will have different levels of cross 
resistance with respect to other pesticides. However, as long as pesticides use a similar 
mode of action, cross-resistance is likely. Hammock and Soderlund, for example, note 
how most neurotoxins used as insecticides "act at only two sites in the nervous system. 
Thus, genetic modifications that change the sensitivity of these sites of action (altered 
' This paper discusses the development of resistance in a muldseason setting, and it introduces the role of 
space explicitly. However, wherever applicable, Hueth and Regev's assumpdons on the characteristics of 
the functions involved are considered. 
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acetylcholinesterase for carbamates and phosphates, nerve insensitivity resistance for 
DDT and pyrethroids) produce cross-resistance that renders entire classes of compounds 
ineffective against resistant populations" (p. 120). 
Given these possibilities, it might be optimal to preserve susceptibility by leaving 
a portion of the crop production region untreated, so that it can serve as a refuge for 
susceptible pests. Their mating with the resistant pests growing in the treated part of the 
region slows down resistance buildup. The use of untreated areas as refiiges for 
susceptible pests is not a novel idea. It has been analyzed by entomologists at the 
theoretical level (see for instance Georghiou and Taylor, and Caprio), and it has been 
advocated in practice as a strategy to slow down the resistance to acaricides used to 
control the two spotted spider mite in pear orchards (Croft and Dunley), imidacloprid 
applied to suppress the Colorado potato beetle in potatoes (Dively et al.) and foliar 
applications of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) used to control the diamondback moth in 
cabbage cultivations (Perez et al.)'. 
Most importantly perhaps, the introduction of genetically modified crops that 
produce Bt toxins lethal to Lepidopteran insects has prompted the Envirormiental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to mandate the use of refuge to preserve the efficacy of the 
toxins (EPA, 1998a). Hurley et al. (1997) provide a clear economic analysis of various 
refuge scenarios in the case of Bt com. 
Consideration of the interaction of space and pest mobility is also important in 
" In the case of weeds, the use of refuges as a resistance management strategy is more controversial. See 
Jasieniuk et al. 
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determining the degree to which private pest control decisions lead to the first best 
outcome. If the pest population is only mobile within a farm's perimeter, there are no 
externalities. However, if more farmers are involved, pest mobility may well create a 
spatial externality', as different levels of treatment will bring about different levels of 
pest population density. Farmers using more pesticide will eliminate a high percentage of 
the pest population, thereby lowering the number of pests moving to neighboring farms. 
Conversely, farmers who use low levels of treatment will have a higher pest population, 
and more pests will tend to move to adjacent farms. An externality is present as long as 
the net influx of pests from one farm to another is different from zero. The externality is 
positive for low-treatment farmers, and negative for the high-treating ones. 
Mobility has implications on susceptibility as well, because pests in the areas 
treated less frequently will have lower resistance, so their movement into the zones 
treated more often will slow down resistance buildup. Thus, in terms of resistance, the 
signs of the externality are reversed: pests moving from low-treatment areas are more 
susceptible to the pesticide, so their mating with the more resistant pests in the high-
treatment areas may help slow down resistance buildup. The effects of mobility 
illustrated above have considerable implications on the optimal pest management 
strategy. If there are many farmers in the crop production region, and each of them is 
optimizing chemical usage and treated area independently from the others, without 
considering the effect of his actions on the neighboring field's pest population and their 
' The exception would be if all fanners behaved identically and had identical fields, in which case the 
externalities would be perfectly offset against each other. 
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dvnamic consequences on the development of resistance, there might be the need of an 
institutional arrangement to coordinate the farmers' decisions, such as a pest management 
group. Miranowski and Carlson discuss how market structure and pest mobility affect 
management strategies, and they point out that "if the pest being considered is mobile, 
optimal management of pest susceptibility may require some form of organization or 
regulation, given the "common property" natiu-e of pest susceptibility" (p. 446)"^. 
To analyze these issues, this chapter develops a discrete time model of optimal 
usage of pesticide and refuge, and determines the shadow values of the pest population 
and of susceptibility to the pesticide. The effects of pest mobility on the first-best policy 
are also discussed. The model's fi-amework is also used to discuss the common property 
aspect of susceptibility and how this can bring about myopic behavior towards the 
buildup of pesticide resistance. The model also allows us to examine the impact of cross-
resistance in the determination of pest management strategies and the role of eradication 
policies. Eradication, if successful, eliminates the pest problem permanently: this 
justifies high one-time or short term expenditures. However, eradication is arduous for 
pests feeding on more than one crop^ (polyphagous) or for very mobile pests, because it 
requires a high level of coordination. A continuous version of the model is also 
developed, in which the farmer only chooses the refuge level. This is the case for Bt 
crops, for which the level of chemical concentration is determined via genetic 
manipulation by the seed producers, and it is also applicable to farmers who follow the 
* For an analysis of conditions of participation into pest management groups, see also Rook and Carlson. 
' For instance, the com borer is also a cotton pest. 
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recommended dosage instructions for spraying. This version is used to analyze the 
optimal time path of the refuge. 
Susceptibility does not necessarily have to be viewed as non-renewable. If there 
are fitness costs, that is, resistant pests are less healthy than the susceptible ones, either in 
terms of reproductive potential or survival capacity, then a reduction in the use of the 
chemical will result in renewed susceptibility. Though circumstances will vary from 
species to species, and from pesticide to pesticide, there are clear instances of non-
reversibility of resistance^. Here we assume that resistant pests behave identically to 
susceptible ones in all respects except in the response to the pesticide. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, a stylized spatiotemporal model is 
presented. Then, first-best management rules are found, and some second best scenarios 
are discussed. Third, we derive a continuous version of the model in which farmers have 
no control over the dose of pesticide to use and we analyze the time path of the refiige. 
Finally, some policy implications of the model are discussed in the conclusions. 
The model 
As noted above, the presence of an explicit spatial component in modeling pest 
management is crucial if we want to understand the impact of refuges in delaying 
pesticide resistance. Even without the introduction of refuges, the spatial dimension -
both in terms of area treated and degree of mobility of the pest - plays an important role 
in determining the degree to which pest population and susceptibility to the pesticide are 
^ See for instance Andrews and Morrison, Croft and Whalon, Penrose, and Romero and Sutton. 
13 
treated as common property resources. Common property characteristics are exacerbated 
if the pest is very mobile and the area being considered is large. 
When introducing a spatial element, care must be taken to insure that all the 
critical spatial effects of the specification chosen are included in the analysis. For 
example, if a square grid is specified, there is a two dimensional variable for r, the 
fraction of the area in which the chemical is used, because for each level of T there is a 
corresponding average distance between treated and imtreated fields, and a variance. 
For clarity and analytical tractability, the problem is modeled here using an 
approach inspired by Von Thiinen's monocentric model'. We assume that the area of 
production is given and that it is represented by a circle, and that r represents the fi-action 
of area in which the chemical is used (Figure n.l). 
No chemical usage Chemical usage over 
area 
100% chemical usage 
Figure H. 1 - The region of production 
See Samuelson for an analytical version of the Von Thiinen model. 
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The area of chemical usage can then be described with a one dimensional 
variable. Define p as the radius of the area under consideration, and remember that for a 
circle ~ = circumference/diameter, and that area ^ is A = {radius)'. Then for any 
share r, such that 0 <t <1, the area of the share is irrp^, versus the total area of the region, 
TTp', and the circumference of the share is 2t/^p, versus the region's circumference, 2tp. 
The circumference is proportional to the radius, so an increase in T brings about a 
IrpAtt'') increase in the size of the circumference. Therefore, in this specification, the 
parameter r suffices to completely characterize the spatial dimension of the model. 
The area of production in this context is identified as being a habitat for the pest 
population, circumscribed by physical boundaries, such as natural barriers, or non-host 
crops for the pest in question. As we noted above, the single decision maker can 
represent one farmer or a group of farmers acting together via an institution such as pest 
management groups. Since we are dealing with ecosystems, the choice of the limits of 
the production region is not inconsequential. If the boundaries are administrative rather 
than real, the pests included in the area examined will not necessarily behave as a 
population. We would have to consider several pest populations or less than one 
population. As will be discussed later, dealing with one habitat does not necessarily 
imply that the pest population is a completely isolated system. 
The model represents a single crop, single pest problem, and it uses the year as 
the time unit. The results are generalizable to a multi-pest, multi-crop situation. The 
sequence of events in each season is based on the behavior of univoltine (one generation 
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per year) European com borers (Ostrinia nubilalis) . We assume that each time period 
starts with the reproduction of the adult pests. Treatment is directed to the offspring, the 
lar\'ae, which cause the crop damage. The larvae then overwinter, pupate and become 
adult moths. The adult moths move, and then reproduce, at which point the next season 
starts (Mason et al.). This model could also be used to describe the life cycle of the com 
rootworm or other pests with minor alterations'. The three fundamental relations of the 
model are; 
Z , = P , [ \ T,; VO], (n. 1) 
P,., = Z, + g{Z, A\ (n.2) 
= 5-, - [h{S,)r{C, T,; Vi. A)l (11.2) 
where: 
Z = pest population causing the damage, 
P = size of pest population at the beginning of time period t (state variable), 
«(•) = function characterizing susceptibility's impact on the pesticide action, 0 ^ <1, 
S = susceptibility level ( state variable). 
® See Mason et al. for a more detailed exposition of the European corn borer's life cycle. 
' In the case of the com rootworm, reproduction occurs at the end of the growing season. Thus, we would 
synchronize the beginning of each time period t with the end of the growing season. The com rootworm 
overwinters in the egg stage. It hatches in the Spring, and the larva causes damage by feeding on the com 
root system. Soil insecticides are applied to prevent larval damage. The com rootworm then pupates and 
becomes an adult in late Summer. This pest causes damage in the adult form as well, so there may be 
different forms of treatment for the same generation of pests. However, the damage caused by the larvae is 
by far more significant (Willson). 
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k { - )  =  chemical efficacy function, 0 ^ <1, 
C = amount of chemical input applied per unit area (control variable), 
T = fraction of the area^i in which the chemical is used(control variable), 0 <t <1, 
X = pest mobility parameter, 
g ( - )  =  pest population growth function, 
t = time, 
A = Trp', total area under consideration, 
//(•) = change in resistance as a function of the level of susceptibility, 0 ^ <1, 
/•( •) = change in resistance as a fiinction of chemical use and area treated, 0 ^ <1. 
Equation (11.1) characterizes the behavior of the pest population causing the 
damage within the course of one season, and it encapsulates the effects of chemical 
treatment and refuge. The pest population causing the damage to the crop, Z, is a linearly 
increasing function of the initial pest population that year, P: 
Zp = {1-[z<(5,)/:(C,, Tf); Vi]} >0 and ZPP = 0, where non-f subscripts denote a partial 
derivative. In this particular formulation, Z can be taken to represent the simple survival 
of a one-generation per year pest population. However, we could define Z more in 
general as Z = z[P, S, C. r, X] to accommodate the case of multiple generations per 
season. In this case, Z could be interpreted as a reduced form of more complex intra-
seasonal dynamic behavior of the pest population. 
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An increase in the chemical dose increases the number of pests killed, kc > 0, and 
decreases the surviving pest population: Zc = - Pt u{St)kc < 0. Note that by C we indicate 
the amount of chemical used per unit area, or the dose. The total amount of pesticide 
used will be given by CTA. We assume that there is diminishing marginal productivity on 
the chemical used: kcc < 0, so that we have Zee = - Pt "{St)kcc > 0. This parameterization 
is equivalent to the assumption made by Hueth and Regev that the pesticide action is not 
density dependent. In the case of the area treated T, a decrease in refuge increases the 
number of pests killed, kr > 0, so that Zt = - Pt iKSt)kr < 0. Because of pest mobility we 
assume diminishing marginal productivity on the sprayed area as well, k-n < 0, therefore 
we have that Zrr = - Pt u{St)krr > 0. Since the dose and the area treated are complements, 
A'cr > 0. These relationships are depicted in Figure n.2. 
Z 
1 r 
Z 
c 
Figure n.2 - The relationship between Z, C and r 
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Intuitively, the function k(-) is such that A-(C,, 0) = k(0, Ti) = 0. The function is 
bounded to the interval [0, 1]. In practice, the upper boundary is likely to be strictly 
smaller than one. Pesticides may not able to control the whole pest population, even if 
sprayed in high doses, because pests may live in parts of the plant, such as the roots, 
which are difficult to reach. 
The function u is bounded between 0 and 1, with «' > 0 and u" > 0. An increase in 
susceptibility to the pesticide decreases the number of surviving pests, 2$ — - Pi u'k < 0. 
The second order effect of susceptibility on the surviving pest population is positive: 
Zss = - Pi > 0. Note that resistance F can be defined as the negative of susceptibility, 
so when 5 = 0, T = {r„ax} and, when T = 0, 5= (Figure 0.3). 
Z 
S 
Z 
r r max 
Figure n.3 - The relationship between Z, S and R 
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For simplicity, we will abstract from the effects of A, the area under 
consideration. Its inclusion in the function would indicate that there are scale and size 
effects involved, as the pest population dynamics may differ depending on the 
dimensions of the region of production. 
The parameter X represents a vector characterizing pest mobility. As this 
constitutes an important element of the model, and its specification has implications on 
the feasibility of eradication policies and on the transversality conditions of the problem, 
a brief digression on how pest mobility has been characterized in the literature follows. 
The traditional distinction is between migration and local dispersal (see for 
instance Johnson). The former refers to inter-habitat movement, while the latter indicates 
intra-habitat dispersal. Both forms of dispersal may coexist (see Byrne er al. on the green 
peach aphid, for example). If that is the case, a 'partial equilibrium' approach, that treats 
the region of production as a closed system, is inappropriate. A better characterization 
would require the use of metapopulations, and of models of stratified dispersal, in which 
discontinuous long distance dispersal and short-distance continuous dispersal are both 
present (Hengeveld). 
More simple, one-population models either impose equations of movement 
(Shigesada and Kawasaki), or start off with an empirical analysis, and then fit rules of 
dispersal from observation to obtain dispersal predictors (see Pacala and Silander for a 
weed example, and Stinner et al. for an insect one), hi either case, the models require 
assumptions on the original pest density, and rules on the boundary conditions. Pests 
reaching the edge of the habitat will either turn back and not cross, or be lost to the 
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population. In the first instance, the boundary condition is called reflecting while in the 
second case, the boundary is absorbing. When dealing with an environment not 
completely isolated, and in the absence of a metapopulation model for the pest in 
question, the boundary rules would have to allow for some infiltration of pests from the 
outside. This is the most interesting possibility in economic terms, because in this case 
eradication policies within the region are not effective, and the susceptibility to the 
pesticide is a resource worth preserving. 
To simplify the present analysis, we assume that the pests have no preferred 
direction of movement, and that the time/distance traveled ratio is inconsequential in 
terms of the choice of pest management strategy, so that a dispersal predictor can be 
approximated with the first two moments of a distribution, and the elements to be 
included in Xare simply the average distance traveled and its variance'®. 
We also assume that the parameter \ which is the result of biological 
characteristics of the pest population considered, is the same for the treated and untreated 
portions of the population. That is, the chemical treatment does not affect mobility of 
surviving pests. Note that, if A = 0, there are effectively two separate populations in the 
area. This assumption is clearly not realistic, since some degree of mobility within each 
region of production is necessary for the pest population to reproduce". If the chemical 
is effective enough to kill the whole population in the area when applied in sufficiently 
high doses, the population could be eliminated in the first period by setting ri = 1, and 
We also need to assume an initial spatial distribution such as a two-dimensional unifonn. 
'' This is obvious for diploid pests that reproduce sexually as they need to move to fmd a partner, but it 
holds also for, say, the haploid phases of fungi, since the mitospores will have to move away in order to 
find a site where to germinate. 
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applying a high enough dose of the pesticide. In this case, resistance would not develop. 
However, in practice, it is likely that the chemical used will have efficacy rates of less 
that 100%, as noted when discussing the function A-( ). Another possibility, as we 
discussed before, could be that the pest population in the region is not totally isolated, in 
which case eradication would not be feasible without substantial concerted efforts, since 
all the farmers operating in the connected habitats would have to be involved. In such an 
instance, we would define the immigrant pest population in the region as > 0, and, 
for logical consistency, we would consider the boundaries as being absorbing'^. 
In general, we can infer the behavior of the pest population with respect to the 
average level of mobility X' included in X for a given C > 0 and T > 0. The use of the 
pesticide at time / reduces the relative pest population density in the treated area, and it 
has no impact on the density of the pests in the untreated area. As the pests move, more 
of them will tend to redistribute from the higher density area (untreated) to the one of 
lower density (treated). The higher the level of mobility, the higher the redistribution of 
pests fi'om the untreated to the treated portion of the region. In period t, this does not 
have any effect on survival: oZ, /aA,' = 0. However, at time / + 1 the population in the 
treated area is higher'^ the greater the average distance traveled. Therefore the same dose 
of chemical and the same area treated will eliminate a higher absolute number of pests: 
Note that, symmetrically, some of the pests lost to the local habitat would survive and emigrate to 
another one. The susceptibility of the immigrant pests could be different from that of the local ones. We 
assume, for simplicity, that they have the same genetic make-up, as if there were n regions of production of 
radius p, all optimizing profits. 
The population density in the area treated increases with mobility, but it will not necessarily be as high as 
the pest population in the untreated area. Very high levels of mobility are necessary to redistribute the pest 
population so that its distribution is homogeneous among the treated and untreated areas. 
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k_, > 0, so that /oA,' = -P_u(S,)k^^ = Z^, < 0. Since \ = X V /, 3Z,/dX' < 0 for any 
t > O'"*. A higher variance of the distance traveled (X~) will increase the chances that pests 
from the untreated area will be lost if the boundaries are absorbing, so that dZ,/d}C < 0 for 
t > O'". Therefore, if the boundaries are absorbing, we can write Z\ < O'^. For 
consistency, we will also assume that Atcxand kr\ are positive. 
Equation (11.2), reproduced below for convenience, denotes the dynamic behavior 
of the pest population: 
P,., = Z,+giZuA). (n.2) 
Equation (11.2) illustrates how the initial population at time r + 1 is a function of 
the surviving population at / after movement has occurred, and possibly of the area of 
interest if there are scale effects. The structure ofg(-) will depend on the growth function 
chosen. If we were to use a discrete time logistic growth function, for instance: 
P,~\ = Z, exp(l+r(l - Z,IK{A)), where K represents the environmental carrying capacity 
{KA >0), then the sign of gz would be at first positive and then become negative. For 
simplicity, here we assume that growth occurs exponentially and we abstract from scale 
'•* For this reason, we will eliminate subscripts for X from now on. 
If the boundaries are reflecting it is not possible to sign dZ,/9X" a priori, because the net effect of a high 
X" will depend on the average distance traveled in relation to the total area. 
Note that, if the refuge were to be rotated from the outside to the inside region every season, we would 
have the opposite sign for Z>, since a higher level of mobility would redistribute the pests into this year's 
treated region which will be, at least partly, next year's refuge area. 
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effects so that P^-i = Z, + <pZt = dZs- Therefore, gz = <t>> 0 and gzz = O'Note that this 
assumption is less restrictive that it may appear at first, since the logistic function 
behaves similarly to the exponential in its lower portion. As long as T and C are strictly 
positive, so that there is some form of population control, it is reasonable to assume that 
we are in the lower part of the growth function, therefore the exponential provides a good 
approximation for the logistic. Since Z\ < 0, we can see the effect of increased mobility 
on the dynamics of the pest population: dPt^\ /d\ = 0(3Z,/9X) < 0 
The rationale for the sign is that a higher level of mobility causes a higher 
redistribution of pests from the untreated to the treated area, so that in the next season, 
there are fewer pests living in the refuge and a higher number of pests that, having moved 
to the treated area, are killed by the pesticide application. High levels of mobility bring 
about higher levels of population redistribution from high to low density areas, so, over 
time, the refuge will retain a smaller part of the pest population. 
Equation (11.3), shown below for convenience, establishes the path of resistance 
evolution. Susceptibility in year r+1 is equal to the stock of susceptibility in the previous 
year t minus the amount of resistance developed in t. For simplicity, we normalize the 
stock of susceptibility to be in the interval [0, 1], so that So = 1: 
5-,., = S, - [/z(5,)r(C, r,; A ) ] .  (0.3) 
'' In the simplest case, P, = Z„ so P\ = Po{ 1 + 0) and Pz=P\{I + <l>)=Po{ 1 + In general, P, = Po(I + </>)'. 
We want <^ > 0 or else the population will either decrease or remain constant over time (Hastings). To 
introduce scale effects, we could have P,» i =<p(A)fV^I + <f>), for instance. 
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The function 0 <r <l is such that: r(0, t,) = r(Ct 0) = 0. Resistance is an 
increasing function of chemical usage, and it is reasonable to assume that rcc ^ 0 since 
this implies that natural selection increases resistance buildup at an increasing rate as 
chemical usage increases. The relationship between the buildup of resistance and the 
area treated is really a dynamic one, therefore a more accurate notation for KT would be 
dri~\/dTi. As discussed above, for any given level of the chemical's dose, an increase in 
the area treated will reduce the number of surviving pests. Correspondingly, the selection 
pressure for resistance will increase, so rT> 0 (Figure II.4). 
As we assumed that rcc > for symmetry, we also assume that rn > 0. The 
reason is that increases in chemical usage, both in extensive and intensive terms, promote 
natural selection pressures at an increasing rate. Since C and r both increase resistance, 
we assume that they are complements: rcr> 0. 
r 
1 T 
Figure II.4 - The relationship between r, rand C 
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The function 0 <1 is such that: /z(0) = 0. Resistance is commonly modeled as 
being conferred by a single not sex-linked allele, partially dominant (Taylor and Hadley) 
or recessive (Hurley et ai). In both cases, the time path of resistance follows a sigmoid 
curve similar to the one in Figure 0.5 (Hartl and Clark). If resistance develops 
according to a sigmoid, as susceptibility decreases, at first h" > 0, and then h' < 0. For 
consistency, we will assume that h" < 0. 
0 
t' I 
Figure 11.5 - The time path of resistance 
We have discussed above the effects of mobility on the pest population density. 
Higher mobility favors the redistribution of the pests, so that through time, a higher 
proportion of the pest population will reach the treated area and be exposed to the 
pesticide. In terms of the effects of mobility on the rate of development of resistance, 
entomological evidence (Peck et ai, 1999, Caprio, 1998) indicates that low rates of 
migration increase the rate of resistance development in the whole region of production. 
The reason is that lower mobility isolates the treated area from the untreated one, thereby 
increasing the speed at which resistance develops locally. The low mobility also limits 
the dispersal of the resistant pests: in effect, the refuge is isolated from the treated area, so 
the resistant pests are less likely to mate with susceptible ones and dilute resistance. The 
mobility results of Peck et al. and Caprio appear to be robust to changes in their models' 
parameters. However, these results are not necessarily general. For instance, the scale 
of the region involved could alter the influence of mobility. Since both models agree on 
the effect mobility has on resistance, we will abstract from scale effects and assume that 
increases in the parameter X shift the curve r(-) downwards. Figure 11.6 illustrates the 
relationship in the r and C space. 
Figure II.6 - The relationship between mobility and resistance development 
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The optimal level of pest control 
The objective function to be maximized by the decision maker with respect to the 
control variables C and r is: 
Y^p'n,+a{Pr,S,) = j;^p-[Y,-D{Z,)-q{C„T,)] + ^ iPT,Sr), (n.4) 
f=0 f=0 
where: 
T = time at which a backstop technology becomes available, assumed to be known, 
p = 1/(1 + o) discount factor, where o is the discount rate, 
n = profit, 
Q (Pr. Sr) = salvage function, 
Y = pest-fi-ee yield for area A, 
D{-) = damage function, 
q{-) = total cost of using the chemical, with qc > 0, qcc ^  and q^ > 0, qrr 
We assume that a rise in the pest population increases the damage at an increasing 
rate, as in Hueth and Regev, since more dense pest populations cause damages to 
escalate. Therefore, Dz > 0 and Dzz > 0. The function q{-) is increasing in both C and T 
and convex in its arguments, and q(0, r,) = qiCt. 0) = 0. Without loss of generality, we 
normalize output price to one, so revenue for area A at time t is equal to pest-free yield 
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minus the damage of the pest. Total profit in year / then is equal to total revenue minus 
production costs, which depend on how much chemical is used and over how much area 
it is used. 
The existence of the salvage function n(Pr. Sr) can be motivated in a number of 
ways. Here, the two that are considered are cross resistance and the potential 
development of alternative technologies based on the same toxin. The latter is in some 
sense a special case of cross resistance, in that resistance to the chemical in one form 
completely overlaps with resistance to the chemical in another form. Such is possibly the 
case of Bt, which is produced in a spray form and by genetically engineered plants. 
Since we have assumed that we know the time when a new technology will 
become available, we have a classical optimal control problem, fixed time, fi"ee state: 
Max Xp'[y,-D(Z,)-q(C„T,)] + n(Pr,Sr), (H.S) 
f=0 
s.t. P,^\ - P, = dZ,-P[ (multiplier fii), 
•S",-! =S,- [h(S,)riCt. T,; Vi)] (multiplier FII), 
0 <r <1 (multipliers /X3 and fu), 
C ^ (multiplier 1X5). 
Note how this shows that Z, is just a function of P,, and thus is not real dynamic 
variable of the problem. The maximization can be rewritten as; 
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^ p - [ Y , - D { P , [ \ - u i S , ) k { c „ T r , K - x ) ] ) - q i C „ T , ) ]  +  a ( , P r , S r ) ,  
t=Q 
S.t. p,-, -p, = dP,{\ - [u{S:)k{Q, Tr, V,)]}- P„ 
Si~i = Si — [/i(5'/)r(Ct, 77; \-i)], 
0 <T <1, and C 
The Lagrange multiplier for the first dynamic relationship, (ii, is negative, because 
an increase in (future) pest populations decreases (future) profits. The current value 
function V is given by: 
V (P,. S„ Q, n t) =r,-D{P,[i- [u(SMQ, rr, V,)]]} - q(C,. Td. (n.6) 
We assume that the starting values for the state variables are: So = max S = S and 
Po = F. The first starting value indicates that no previous use was made of the resource 
susceptibility. In relation to the previous discussion on the salvage function, this means 
that the chemical in question is the first one to have an effect on the susceptibility, both 
directly and indirectly through cross-resistance. 
Then we can write the current value Hamiltonian for the problem, H, as: 
H= nPi. St, Q, T,. I) 
4- pp,[d(l -uiSdKQ, T,; V,))- 1] + p[- h(Sdr{C:, Tr, Vi)]. (n.7) 
This Hamiltonian is not necessarily concave with respect to the state and control 
variables. However, for reasonable parameterizations of the problem it is possible to 
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ensure concavity and therefore a unique solution. The Lagrangian for the problem is the 
Hamiltonian augmented by the constraints 0 <t <1 and C 
I = //+ (1- r,) + fMT, + fisC. 
We will assume interior solutions throughout, so that fi^ = fu = /is = 0, and L = H. We 
can now get first order conditions: 
So — E, (n.8) 
P o ^  p .  cn.9) 
P,., - P , =  d H ( t )  /  d ( p  )=dz,-Ft, cn. 10) 
S,., - 5, = dH{t) / d(jj ) = - h{S,)r{C, T,; V,), (n.ll) 
o = a//(/)/ac, (n.i2) 
Q = dH{t)/dr„ (n.l3) 
(n.i4) 
/^r' - = - 3//(0 /ds„ (n. 15) 
[^ - ^ p{Pt, STrnPr-Pmin] = 0, (n.l6) 
ful >QP(PT,ST), 
PT ^Pmin, 
[ -fi ^ Pt. ^ r)]=0, (H. 17) 
fil >ns(PT.Sr), 
ST ^min-
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Note that P„in represents the lowest possible pest population in the production 
area, while Smin denotes the minimum level of susceptibility needed for the new 
technology to be effective. As we discussed before, if eradication is possible, there is no 
reason to preserve susceptibility to the pesticide, and the salvage function equals zero, so 
the transversality conditions reduce to having PT = Pmin = 0 and ST = Smin = 0. Therefore 
in the following analysis, we will focus on the case in which eradication of the pest 
population is not a feasible option. 
The first order condition with respect to the chemical's use C is: 
0 = dH{t) /dQ = D,P: u{Sdkc -qc-P BP, u(S,)kc - p h{S^rc. (H. 18) 
The first order condition rearranged below shows that, at the optimum, the 
marginal cost of the chemical must equal the effect of the marginal change in chemical 
dose on the damage caused by the pest population plus (remember that is negative) 
the discounted shadow value of the reduction in the future pest population minus the 
discounted shadow value of the increase in resistance buildup due to the usage of the 
chemical. These are the terms of the trade-off in the use of the pesticide. The marginal 
benefits in terms of present and future reduction in the pest populations must equal the 
sum of two types of marginal costs: direct production costs, and costs of resistance 
buildup: 
qc =D,P, u{,Sdkc-P /i,"' eP, u(S,)kc - P 
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In the case of the area treated, r .  
0 = dH(t)/dT, = DzPt u(St)kr -qr-p 6Pt u{St)kr - p h{S[)rT. (H. 19) 
This first order condition, as rewritten below, indicates that, at the optimum, the 
marginal cost of increasing the treated area equals the marginal impact of a change in 
area treated on the damage made by the present pest population plus the discounted 
shadow value of the effect of increasing the treated area on the future pest population 
minus the discounted shadow value of the change in resistance buildup due to the 
variation in the treated area. As in the case of the intensive application of the pesticide, 
in terms of extensive use, at the optimum, the marginal benefits in terms of present and 
future reduction in the pest population equals the sum of production cost and resistance 
cost: 
QR = D,P, LLISDKR - P /^R' EP, UISDKR - P KSTYR. 
As for the transversality conditions, if the binding condition is //,^ = fi P{PT. ST) 
then PJ '^MIN > 0, and similarly, = ns{^r, ST), and ST ^MIN > 0, so that the value of 
susceptibility at time T is positive. Note that, in the case of the state variable 
susceptibility, the problem could be transformed into a fixed time, fixed state one as well. 
The rationale for that would be that the amount of susceptibility needed by the backstop 
technology is known. If the susceptibility is useless, then the desired final state for S is 
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ST= 0. Alternatively, if there is cross resistance and/or the backstop technology operates 
on the same susceptibility (in a different way), then the requirement is a positive ST- In 
the case of P, if a fixed state were desired, such as Pr= 0, it would be equivalent to 
saying that eradication of the pest is the objective at the end of the life span of the 
chemical (for logical cogency, then, it would have to be Sr= 0 also). 
The determination of the transversality conditions will allow us to identify some 
characteristics of the path of the costate variables. First, we rewrite the first order 
condition (11.14) to get an explicit expression for the change in value of the multiplier 
through time: 
//r'-//; = -dH(0/dP, = -[dnO/dP,+ PMr9(l-[ii(SMQ. T,; Vi)])-l],or (n.20) 
-p; =Dz(l - [^(1 - uk) - 1]. 
Since, for positive levels of chemical controls, (1 - uk) < 1, the sign of - //,' 
will vary. If 0(1 - uk) is bigger than one, the pests are able to generate enough offspring 
to reach at least the previous year's population level. In such a case, since fii is negative, 
this relationship shows that higher pest populations at the beginning of the time period 
are more costly, because they increase the size of the pest populations for the all 
remaining periods. Similarly, for fi2 we have: 
- / / :  = - d H /ds„  
ju':'-^'=-{dv/ds, -pMr0Py(s,)k(c,,T,-,x,,,)-pM::'hxsMC.,T,,^..,)}, (n.2i) 
//r' - n[=-D^Pu'k-¥ p^j["ep,u • k + • r. 
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If resistance develops according to a sigmoid, as S decreases, at first hs > 0 and 
then hs <0. However, if we assume that a change in susceptibility has a greater impact 
on the present and future effectiveness of the pesticide than on the development of 
resistance'^, so that DzPtu'k - p BPtu'k - p fj!^^ h'r > 0, then we can sign as 
globally negative. This implies that the additional marginal benefits of susceptibility are 
decreasing through time, because, as the stock of susceptibility is mined, the pesticide 
loses efficacy, both in the present and in the future. Even when resistance buildup is 
growing at a decreasing rate, so that decreases in susceptibility have less and less of an 
impact on the evolution of resistance, the effects of susceptibility on the present and 
future efficacy of the pesticide are still high enough to keep the shadow value of an 
increment in susceptibility starting at time /+1 lower than that of an increment in 
susceptibility starting at time t. To find the shadow values, we use the transversality 
conditions. If Q P{PT, Sj) znd ^ = n5(/'r.-Sr), we can write: 
+ m{t) /bPTA = QKPt, ST) + dH(t) /dPr-u 
=QP{PT, ST) — Dzt-I(^ —wr-i^r-i) P^P{PT, '^r)[(^(l -wr-i^r-i)-
' =^p(Pt. 5'r)[l-p+P 5(1 -Mr-i^'r-i)] -
^T-2 ^ ^ [•^ + dH(t)/dPT.2, 
M\ '  ^ ^ -DzT-liX -  ^T-lkT-l) + ^ [5(1 - UT-jkT-l) — 1]» 
= piPr.ST)[\-p+P 5(I-Mr-i^r-i)]-^zr-i(l—"r-i^r-i)}[l-p+p5(l-Mr-2^r-2)] 
—DzT-li\ —UT-lkT-l)-
This is not a very strong assumption, since it is equivalent to saying that susceptibility is a global good: 
d H { t ) / d S ,  >  0. 
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Therefore, if we define [\—p+pd{\-UT.ikT-i)\- Mr-i '• 
-  ^ p(PT, Sr), 
= iip(Pr. ST) Mr-1 — Dzr-ii^ — "r-i^'r-i), 
= [QP{PT, ST) MT- i - Dzt-\{^ - "r-i^^r-i)] Mj-j -Dzr-ii^ — ur-ikr-j), 
= Qp^PT.ST) MT-\ MT-Z •••MT-i—Dzr-\iy—UT-\kT.\)^T-z •••Mr-i ••• 
-Dzj-i^ 1 (1 -M r-i+1 ^  r-i+1) A/r - J — Dzr-ti. 1 - « r-i ^Y-i) • 
In general: 
j-i 
= 
k = l  
fl ^ r-. - - u,_,kr.,) . (11.22) 
A=*»I 
As the expression below shows, an increase in the value (cost) of the pest 
population in the salvage ftinction directly affects the shadow value of the pest 
population. As there is a link between the present and future levels of the pest 
population, when the cost of having a pest population at the final time T increases, the 
pest population's shadow value will increase for all the periods preceding T: 
dQ. ' Y .Mr-r P y=o 
Similarly, for the second multiplier, we D2P,u\S^)k{C,,T,,X^_^) = Qt, 
GP^u'{S,)k{C,,T/,X^_^)= J[, and A'('S',)r(C,,r,;A,.,) = Xi. Then we have that 
H ( t ) / d S , =  Q [ - p n ' *  y,A",, so we can rewrite (n.21) to get: 
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- dH{t) /dS, = Mz' +Q'-P a"' ^  ( \ - P  Xr) ^  Or-P  J,. 
Note how the shadow value of susceptibility depends directly on that of the pest 
population. The higher the cost of the pest, in terms of present and fiiture damage, the 
higher the value of preserving susceptibility. As in the previous case: 
fil = ^ ^PT.STX 
= JJ^ PXR-X)QT-\- P J T-I =  ^ ^ P T. S T) PX TA) Q T - \ — P  J T - I ,  
=  / I F  '  ( 1  -  pXr- L )  + Q T-2 - P ^ JT-2, 
MZ '  ~ L^SIPR-SR) (I-pXr. \ )  + QT-I -  p P-X^T-I) + QT-I — P JT-2, 
= l]5{Pr,5r)(l-p^r-i) -..(l-p^T--,) + {QT A  -  P  JR - X )  {1-PXR - I )  ...(l-p^r-,) +... 
-P^'^- Jr-i^xKl-pXr-d + (QT-.- P 
In general: 
= n s ( P r . S r ) t l ( l - p X r ^ )  +  f,l(Q,^ - pXr^.,n 
k=i i=i k (11.23) 
"•"07-1 ~ •^r-i • 
This way we can substitute in the values of /ii calculated above to obtain explicit 
values for both the costate variables. As in the case of fi\, an increase in the terminal 
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value of susceptibility, 05, directly increases the shadow value of susceptibility; 
In this model susceptibility does not possess any existence value, and it has social 
significance only because of its effect on the renewable resource via the pesticide's 
action. Since it does not add to biodiversity, susceptibility is worthless without the 
economic significance of the pest population it is coupled with. If the pest population 
does not cause any damage, D(Z) = 0 V /, and ST) = ^ ^PT, ST) = 0. Since there is 
no damage, there is no chemical usage, and we have that//,^"= 0, and QT-I = 0, so that 
It is apparent that a permanent increase in mobility will cause a reduction in the 
(negative) shadow value of the pest population in each time period, since the same 
combination of dose and refuge is more effective in controlling the pest. However, it is 
reduced in every period. Therefore, it cannot be ascertained theoretically that lower 
refuges will be required in each time period for more mobile pests. The reason is 
twofold. The first is linked to the sigmoid shape of resistance development. In some 
periods, the marginal impact of the stock of susceptibility on its rate of change, h\ may 
impact the path of resistance in such a way as increase the shadow value of susceptibility 
for a more mobile pest. The second reason is that, the pest population being less 
valuable, there is less of an economic incentive to spray the area: for instance, if the pest 
" This is an important caveat, since a more mobile pest population might have a bigger habitat size. 
T-i 
not possible to say, ceteris paribus^^, whether the shadow value of susceptibility is 
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population causes negligible damages, the field will not be sprayed at all, effectively 
becoming refuge. Therefore, it might be optimal to increase the refuge level, at least in 
some years, for more mobile pests. This is likely to have implications on resistance 
management strategies for the second generation of Bt crops, now in the experimental 
phase, which provide control against the com roorworm, a more mobile pest than the 
European com borer. 
The effects of suboptimal management 
There are many possible ways to characterize second best situations within this 
model's framework. For instance, if we assume that there is only one decision maker, 
she could exhibit myopic behavior. While myopic behavior with respect to the pest 
population's increases is less likely in a realistic setting, since changes in the pest 
population are more immediately visible to the farmer, lack of consideration of resistance 
development is a possibility, particularly if the time frame of reference is long. It could 
also be the case that the pest is extremely mobile, or feeds on more than one crop, so that 
its resistance development dynamics become unintelligible to the decision maker. In the 
context of the optimization set up above, the myopic optimum would be: 
0 ^H{t) /dC, = D,P, u(S,)kc -qc-p ^A u^Sdkc, (11.24) 
qc u{St)kc- p dP, u{,St)kc, 
0 ^Hitydr, = D,P, u(S,)kr -qr-P QP' i*iS,)k„ (n.25) 
qr ^,P, uiS:)kr - P BP, u{S,)kr. 
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In this case, refuge serves no purpose in terms of preserving susceptibility. We 
will have r < 1 only if the marginal cost of increasing the area treated rises rapidly. For 
relatively flat cost functions, we are likely to have comer solutions: it will be optimal to 
plant no refuge at all. 
The model can also be used to illustrate how having more than one decision 
maker might bring about second best outcomes, since the existence of externalities will 
create incentives for farmers not to comply with the refuge policy. Compliance is likely 
to be an issue for the Bt crops (Hurley et ai, 1999). Suppose we had n farmers in the 
region of production, each farming an area of A/n = rp'/n (Figure n.7). 
Two farmers Eight farmers 
Figure 11.7 - More than one decision maker 
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If each farmer is rational and well informed, and takes into consideration the 
effects of his/her actions on susceptibility, given that each farmer's actions have identical 
effects, the optimal management strategy is still attainable. However, as n increases, and 
each fanner's marginal impact on resistance management goes to zero, there will be a 
tendency to free ride. Since each season the pests cause the crop damage and then move, 
farmers that do not treat will still suffer reductions in yield. Consequently, they will then 
tend not to plant the refuge but will still spray. In temis of the dose, the net impact of 
free riding is ambiguous, since it will depend on the size of two opposite effects. Farmers 
care less about future pest populations and damages, so they spray only to control present 
populations. At the same time, farmers also care less about resistance, which will cause 
them to spray more. This is consistent with the conclusions of Regev et al., in which 
only the optimal dose issue was analyzed. In terms of the refuge, however, the results are 
not ambiguous, unless the cost function is very steep. If the cost of extending the area 
treated is not very high, since farmers see no benefits in the planting of refuge besides the 
reduction in cost, the presence of externalities will result in pesticide overapplication in 
spatial terms. We are then in the situation described in equations (11.26) and (11.27): 
0 ^H{t) /dCt = DzPi u{S,)kc-qc, (n.26) 
<jc ^D:P[U(S,)kc, 
0 ^H(i)/dr, = D-P,u{St)kT~ qr. (n.27) 
qr ^:Pt u{Si)kr. 
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Fanners will equate the direct cost of increasing the chemical dose with the 
marginal benefit a higher dose has in reducing the current pest population. Similarly, the 
benefit in current pest reduction offsets the marginal cost of expanding the area treated. 
In this context, since planting refuge has no benefits besides the reduction in spraying 
costs, the whole area is likely to be treated. 
Miranowski and Carlson note that the incentive to free ride is stronger for more 
mobile pests, because susceptibility becomes more of a common property resource. This 
implies that high levels of pest mobility may be a mixed blessing for pest control. On the 
one hand, as we saw before, high pest mobility has positive effects on the delaying of 
resistance buildup and on the number of siu^iving pests. On the other hand, the 
contribution of each farmer's action towards pest control is harder to observe for mobile 
pests, so that free riding is more likely. 
Another possible second best instance is given by the underestimation of 
problems of cross-resistance. If the decision maker believes that the backstop technology 
will rely on a completely different mode of action^®, Q5 = 0. In such a case, /ff = 0, so 
the shadow value of susceptibility is lower in each time period, and equation (11.23) 
reduces to: 
=Z[(e„ 01.28) 
k = l  k  
Once again, we are assuming that eradication is not a feasible option. 
42 
Susceptibility will have a lower value, since it brings benefits to the farmer only 
within the period in which the pesticide is used, and this will imply a heavier use of the 
chemical. Note, however, that this will not necessarily mean that refuges will not be 
used. Intuitively, the longer the time frame for the usage of the chemical and the more 
economically significant the damage of the pest, the more important it is to preserve 
susceptibility. 
Similarly, let us suppose that the decision-maker aims at eradicating the pest 
population. In this case, we could have a situation in which a comer solution for both the 
dose and refuge is optimal: farmers spray the highest consented dose over all of their 
fields, so as to eliminate the pest as quickly as possible. If the decision maker is wrong in 
thinking that eradication is feasible - say because he has underestimated the size of the 
immigrant pest population in the habitat - he might have to bear large long-term costs, 
because the pesticide has become less effective due to the intensive use that eradication 
requires, while the pest population has not been eliminated and still needs to be 
controlled. 
The case of a fixed dose 
We will now analyze a particular form of the problem discussed so far. We will 
assume that the only decision variable that the farmer has at his disposal is the amount of 
refuge to plant, and that the dose is exogenous to his choice set. The dose can be 
considered fixed if farmers follow literally the instructions on recommended dosage for 
traditional spraying pesticides, but, perhaps more importantly, this formulation reflects 
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the farmer's choice set in the case of Bt crops, since the dose is determined by the 
chemical company. So far, the literature on Bt crops has concentrated on static refuges, 
that is. refuges whose size is fixed throughout the period in which the pesticide is used 
(see for instance Hurley et al., 1997 and 1999, Livingston et al. 2000). The rationale for 
this is that nowadays research on refuges has very strong policy implications, and the 
EPA has focused its attention on static refuges, since they are considered easier to 
implement''. The next pages provide a first insight on how a first best policy may differ 
from the static refuge case. 
In order to analyze the time path of reflige, the problem is presented in continuous 
time form. The equations of motion become: 
S  =  - h { S ) r { r ) ,  and 
P  =  G P [ \ - u { S ) k i T ) ] .  
The present value Hamiltonian is: 
H { i )  =  Y -  D [ P { \  -  u { S ) k { z ) ) ]  -  q { T )  + { t ) e P [ \  -  M(5)^(r)] - (r)/,(5);-(r). (0.29) 
For realistic parameterizations, this Hamiltonian will be concave. Assuming once 
again interior solutions, the first order condition with respect to the control variable is: 
Note that, in practice, refuge recommendations have not been constant, since the EPA has been regularly 
updating the refijge management policy (see EPA 1999b, and 1998a). 
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Q^S^ = D'Pk\T)u{S) -q,- pM,{t)ePk '(rM^) - p n . { t ) h i S ) r \ T )  .  (n.30) 
The adjoint equations are: 
r-H /i, =-^ = Z)'(l-"(Wr))-p/i,0[l-M(5)^(r)],and (HJl) 
o P  
Pm ' i S )k{T) + p^,ePu \S)k{T) + pLuh '(5)r(r). (n.32) 
d S  
We differentiate the first order condition to get: 
\_D "[1 - u k ] P  +  { \ - p )  { D  •- n,e)]k  • uep[\ -  u k ]  -  p ' n ^ e P u  ' k h r '  
^ + [iD" Pki4 - D'+ pp^9)Pk' u'+ p^Ji' r\l - p)]hr + pD' Pu' khr' J 
{£»" [Pk' u]' -D'Pk " u + pn,GPk " u + puJir "} 
Tlie optimal poUcy is to decrease the amount of refuge at first, when resistance 
r  ' ( r )  k  increases at an increasing rate, that is, when /j' > 0, if we assume that p  >  .  
r(r) k { z )  
This assumption forces the elasticity of the resistance function to be globally higher than 
the elasticity of the kill function. In essence, this implies that as the area treated changes, 
the development of resistance is more responsive to the changes than the percentage of 
pest population killed off (Details of the proof are given in the appendix). Farmers start 
off at time zero with a relative high level of refuge and then decrease it because the 
marginal benefits in terms of resistance decrease through time as the resistance increases 
at an increasing rate. 
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When resistance starts increasing at a decreasing rate, it is no longer possible to 
say a priori what should happen to the size of the refuge. Resistance increases more 
slowly, which implies that the marginal value of increasing refuge is lower. Of course, 
this marginal impact of refuge has to be counterbalanced by the fact that, in absolute 
terms, resistance is already relatively high so that the refuge is not as useful as it was 
b e f o r e .  T h i s  i s  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  r e f l i g e  p o l i c y  d e b a t e  f o r  B t  
crops. As we noted before, the EPA and the industry (EPA, 1999a) are thinking in terms 
of constant refuge recommendations, and so is the theoretical literature (for instance 
Hurley et al., 1997 and 1999). The rationale for the policy is that it is believed that it 
might be problematic to inform farmers on the optimal refuge size each year. The last 
result shows that this approach is not economically optimal - at least if administration 
costs for the policy are excluded. 
Conclusions 
The model underscores how the success of a long term pest management strategy 
is going to depend on two classes of factors; biological and economical. The 
characteristics of the pest population, ranging from mobility to reproduction, and the 
dynamics of resistance development are crucial elements of the policy. Of no lesser 
importance are the attributes of the farmers planting the crop and of the pesticide they 
use, as Miranowski and Carlson point out. Market structure of the chemical industry, 
farm size and pest mobility are going to be key factors in the determination of the 
management strategies. 
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It is not possible to say explicitly how mobility affects the first best refuge policy. 
However, since higher mobility means that susceptibility becomes more of a common 
property resource, suboptimal refuges are more likely for highly mobile pests. If the 
farmers have control over the dose, the effect of the concentration of chemical used will 
be ambiguous: susceptibility is carried by pests, and as mobility increases, both future 
pest populations and their genetic makeup become common property resources. 
The families of pesticides available are limited, and some of them share comjnon 
modes of action. For instance, the four major classes of synthetic organic insecticides 
produced in the post-war period, chlorinated hydrocarbons, carbamates, 
organophosphates and pyrethroids, are all nerve poisons (Hammock and Soderlund). To 
the extent that cross-resistance is present, long term strategies that put a positive value on 
the preservation of susceptibility are needed. The need to preserve susceptibility, 
therefore, will not disappear even for the next generation of biotechnology products, 
which are likely to possess stacked toxins, as long as these toxins exhibit some degree of 
cross-resistance. The analysis presented in this chapter illustrates how the likelihood of 
cross-resistance in the fUture influences current management practices. 
In the case of a fixed dose, the results point out that the use of static refuges is not 
a first best policy. It makes intuitive sense that refuge should be higher at the beginning 
of the time frame of analysis, since this means that susceptibility will preserved for a 
relatively long time. The main limitation of this analysis - common to all the existing 
literature - is that it takes the level of market penetration of the new technology as 
complete. In practice, market penetration is likely to be only partial. The next chapter 
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will examine the impact of market penetration on the dynamics of resistance development 
and the returns to the farmers. 
In the choice of eradication versus pest management, attention must be paid to the 
biology of the pest population, and to its mobility in particular. If a pest is mobile over 
great distance and/or it is polyphagous, eradications are likely to fail. Policy makers 
should also take into account the existence and cost of alternative forms of control for the 
pest, should eradication fail. 
The time in which a new technology becomes commercially available is at least 
partly endogenous. The longer the regulatory process takes for the approval of a new 
product, the longer existing technologies will have to be viable. If, as the historical 
evidence suggests, environmental and food safety are a luxury good, then richer countries 
might have to implement policies such as refuge to prolong the life-span of pesticides. 
In more general terms, this model points to the importance of taking a systemic 
approach to pest management. Habitat size, crop systems, spatial and temporal behavior 
of the pest population are all important elements in the determination of a pest 
management strategy. Entomologists have long recognized the need to analyze the pest 
problem in the context of the whole production system in which they cause damage 
(Pedigo). Failure to do so may cause policies to be substantially ineffective or even 
backfire. 
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chapter iii. 
impact of market penetration 
and pest mobility on corn 
Introduction 
The use of agricultural biotechnologies has been increasing dramatically in the 
United States since the mid 1990s. Among the most successful crops are Bt plant-
pesticides, engineered to express the Bacillus Thuringiensis (Bt) 5-endotoxins and 
targeting the European Com Borer (ECB). Bt pesticides have long been used in spray 
form by organic and Integrated Pest Management (IPM) farmers, and their effectiveness 
and safety are well established. Because these farmers and environmental groups are 
concerned about the possible development of resistance to Bt by the targeted pests, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires farmers who want to grow Bt com and 
cotton to plant refuges. Refuges are portions of the field in which non-Bt seed is sown, 
and Bt insecticides are not sprayed, so as to allow the interbreeding of pests susceptible to 
Bt with resistant pests. This interbreeding slows down resistance buildup. Refuge is 
coupled with high doses of the toxin throughout the season and throughout the com plant, 
so that only the few resistant pests survive. 
EPA's current refuge requirements are based on certain fundamental assumptions. 
At the market level, the conjecture is that market penetration will be complete, or 
equivalently, that no externalities will occur in the resistance management plan because 
of pest mobility. Mobility creates extemalities in the management of susceptibility to a 
pesticide unless all farmers behave identically and their fields have identical 
characteristics. Otherwise, farmers spraying less have higher levels of susceptible 
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populations, so that pest movement into the fields of high-spraying farmers creates both a 
negative externality, the net influx of pests in their fields, and a positive one, since those 
very pests will be more susceptible to the pesticide. 
Pest mobility can substantially alter the efficacy of resistance management plans, 
because when mobility is present resistance becomes a common property resource. The 
level of pest mobility determines the extent of the externality created and therefore 
influences the resistance management strategy (Miranowski and Carlson). Therefore, the 
issue of pest mobility goes hand in hand with that of market penetration. When different 
pest control practices are used in adjacent fields, the natural selection that gives rise to the 
development of resistance may be countered by the movement of pests fi-om field to field. 
This movement affects the pest population genetic make-up and may dilute the evolution 
of resistance. The extent to which this alleviation will occur will depend on the market 
penetration of the resistance-inducing technology. 
The EPA implicitly acknowledges that pest mobility is a crucial component of the 
resistance question, since the very rationale of the EPA's regulatory effort is based on the 
possibility that, because of pest mobility, resistance may spread, making the Bt used as a 
spray in organic farming ineffective (EPA, 1998a). The same population biology 
processes behind the in-field refuge strategy apply to the field to field case. The EPA and 
entomologists, in fact, call the fields planted with non-5/ hybrids unstructured or market-
driven refuge (see for instance EPA 1998d). 
Figures EH. I and III.2 show the level of B t  com market penetration in 1999 by 
county for the US, and they suggests that market penetration is varied, ranging fi-om less 
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than 10% to over 50% of the com acreage. This entails the need to analyze in more detail 
the importance of market penetration in the development of resistance. On the one hand, 
the penetration of the Bt technology could remain limited, and the presence of 
unstructured refuge might be enough to guarantee that resistance never becomes a 
concern. This is a distinct eventuality, given the Japanese and European position on 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). On the other hand, knowledge of the impact of 
market penetration on resistance could improve the effectiveness of resistance 
management policy. In particular, to identify the threshold market penetration for which 
the unstructured refuge becomes ineffective could prompt regulatory authorities to 
monitor refuge compliance more closely, or to increase the level of refuge recommended. 
In is important to note that the issues analyzed here are likely to become more 
central to policy makers, because the industry is developing new genetically modified 
crops that will be active against both the com rootworm and the ECB. 
The problem of resistance development had been analyzed by economists since 
the 1970s (Taylor and Hadley, 1975; Hueth and Regev, 1974; Regev, Gutierrez and 
Feder, 1976; Regev, Shalit and Gutierrez, 1983). In line with these models, susceptibility 
to a pesticide will be considered a nonrenewable resource, that is, it will be assimied that 
there are no fimess costs: resistant pests have the same reproductive potential aJid 
survival capacity as susceptible ones. 
Figure lll.l - U.S. Distribution of Bi Com 
The figure represents the percentage of total corn acreage planted to Bt corn hybrids in counties in which > 50,000 total acres of 
corn were planted. 
Source: Bt com industry sales data as compiled by FSl, Inc., 1999. 
Figure 111,2 - Distribution of Bt Com - Central Corn Belt 
The figure represents the percentage of total corn acreage planted to Bt corn hybrids in Central Com Belt 
counties in which > 50,000 total acres of corn were planted. 
The numbers represent county identifiers and not the level of market penetration. 
Source: Bt com industry sales data as compiled by FSI, Inc., 1999. 
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This chapter presents a dynamic farm production model and uses simulation 
results to analyze the interplay between the externalities created by pest mobility and the 
management of resistance at different levels of market penetration and pest mobility. The 
object is to determine the effect of pest mobility on the buildup of resistance. As noted 
above, there is evidence that the ECB mobility is limited. A recent study has suggested 
that mobility is higher than previously assimied (Showers et al.), but given the 
insufficient amount of evidence, the model presented below analyzes the problem at 
various levels of pest mobility. The model is applied to the case of com production, and 
uses a grid of nine fields which can be sown with the Bt seed or with a traditional com 
hybrid. The model is developed along the methodological lines of Lazarus and Dixon 
and Hurley et al. (1997). Lazarus and Dixon use a nonlinear programming model to 
combine both common property resource issues with explicit genetics for the com 
rootworm, while Hurley et al. (1997) examines the economic value of mechanisms to 
slow down resistance build-up for Bt crops. 
The model 
The model builds on Hurley et al. (1997). It is based on pest population dynamics 
that allow the direct measurement of resistance development following the Hardy-
Weinberg principle, with resistance being conferred by a single allele, so that the pest 
population is composed of homozygote susceptible (SS), heterozygote (RS) and 
homozygote resistant (RR) individuals. The only difference with the genetics of the pest 
population in the Hurley et al. (1997) model is that a random element is introduced to 
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mimic the real variability of the pest population from year to year, since European com 
borers' populations are highly variable, and it is difficult to accurately predict com borer 
pressure from the previous' year pest population size. Also, adding a stochastic element 
prevents a collapse in the ECB population in the field without suddenly increasing the 
population size beyond reason. Deterministic models tend to exhibit such a long-term 
collapse of the pest population, a phenomenon which most observers think is unrealistic. 
Each year, the initial pest population size is drawn from a uniform random 
distribution. The stochastic shock does not affect the genetic make up of the pest 
population, because it represents environmental conditions such as weather and amount 
of rainfall. The random number is the same for all the fields considered, reflecting the 
fact that the atmospheric conditions are likely to be similar across adjacent fields, but the 
scale of the shock is proportional to the size of the previous' year surviving population. 
Scaling increases the realism of the simulation results in two ways. First, in general, the 
European com borer populations in the Bt fields will be smaller than those in the non-5r 
fields, so that resistance to Bt might actually occur'. Second, farmers treating with 
traditional sprays will be unable to drive the pest populations to extinction. 
The pest population analyzed has two generations per year (bivoltine), but the 
model is generalizable to uni-or multi-voltine populations. More generally, this 
framework is easily applicable to all pests which exhibit some degree of mobility. 
' It is essential that populations be fairly small for resistance to become prevalent, since the initial 
frequency of the resistance gene is very low to start with. As the pest population size declines, susceptible 
pests (and their genes) will all be killed by the pesticide and the resistant pests will take over. 
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ranging from insects to weeds and fungi, and to crops which suffer damage from a 
common pest population'. 
The model is based on nine com fields, some of which—always the same^--are 
planted with Bt com. Following Onstad and Guse and Mason et al., the damage function 
of the ECB is linear, but differentiated across generations. First generation ECBs cause 
more damage to com because they attack it at an earlier stage of development when the 
plant stalk can withstand less damage. The farmer planting the non-5/ com has the 
choice of applying a non-5/ based pesticide for both the first and second generation of 
pests. The cost of applying the chemical input is fixed, and the pesticide has a maximum 
efficacy bound which is set at various levels, ranging from 70% to 90%. The reason for 
analyzing various levels of efficacy is that the level of efficacy of the sprayed pesticide 
determines the effective size of the unstructured refijge: for a given level of market 
penetration, the higher the efficacy of the spray, the lower the effective level of 
unstructured refiige. Also, the effectiveness of sprays has been increasing in the recent 
past, so that at this time efficacy can reach 90% in optimal conditions (Dr. Hellmich, 
personal communication). The decision to spray is based on economic thresholds which 
are described in Mason et air, the thresholds depend on the level of damage of the pest, 
the costs of spraying, and, of course, the effectiveness of the pesticide. As we noted 
above, the pest population modeled are in the high range, since this is mostly the case in 
locations where significant acreage of Bt com is planted. 
" For instance, the model could be applied to com and cotton, which are both ECB hosts. 
"" This appears to be a non-trivial question when analyzing resistance development. See Peck et al. 
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The Bt farmers plant com and refuge, which is left unsprayed. The refiige size 
considered is 20% of the field, which is consistent with current EPA regulation. 
Following Hurley et al. (1997), this proportion of the field is constant throughout the time 
horizon. The yearly profit per acre for the Bt farmer is given by: 
{(1 - e) p Y [ \  -  ) ]  -  P} +  0 p j [ \  -  )] - C, (DI. 1) 
where"^: 
6 = proportion of refuge, here 20%, 
Py = real com price per bushel at 1992 prices, S 2.35, 
Y = pest free average yield, 130 bushels per acre, 
N g i  and Ng2 = number of pests per plant, first and second generation, 
EGI and EG2 = damage per pest per plant, EGI = 0.05 and EG2= 0-024, 
C = costs of production net of the spraying price, SI 85 per acre, 
P = Bt premium, S10 per acre. 
We assume there are no price nor yield differentials between the Bt com and the 
hybrid planted in the reftige. Since the damage function is linear and mating is random, 
we can rewrite equation (m.l) as: 
P y Y [ \ -  { E G X N (71+ ECTLN(72)] - C- BP. (ni.2) 
For the specific values see Mason et al., Onstad and Guse, and Hurley et al. (1997). 
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The non-Bi farmer maximizes: 
Pyy[l - £c,JVci(a(l-S,)) - EaiNci(ce(l-Sz)] - S.), (in.3) 
s.t. a e [0.7, 0.90] and 5e {0,1}, 
where: 
Ps = cost of the spray application, SI4 per acre, 
S = non-5r spray application, 
a = ma.ximum efficacy of the non-5/ spray. 
The sizes of the initial pest population in the Bt and non Bt fields in each season 
are calibrated to ensure that spraying occurs regularly in the non-5/ fields throughout the 
15 years considered, and that the pest population in the Bt fields can reach the small size 
necessary for resistance to develop in the absence of mobility but does not collapse and 
can increase again once resistance is established. The initial pest population in the non-
Bt fields each year is given by: 
N^,{t) = e, and 
^-(7[0,0.1]. (MA) 
The initial pest population in the Bt fields each year is given by the surviving second 
generation pests, , plus the stochastic element € scaled by a factor <f>: 
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= -I)+ <!>£, 
(p = 0.000001, and (01.5) 
^~C/[0,0.1]. 
The presence of the previous year survivors in the determination of the initial pest 
population for the next season guarantees that the pest population numbers in the Bt fields 
can increase once resistance is established. The shock, common to Bt and non Bt fields, 
guarantees that the population does not collapse, while the scaling factor <(> ensures that, 
at first, the pest population numbers decrease enough for resistance to develop. 
The intra-season population dynamics, that is, the relationship between first and 
second generation, is the same as in Hurley et al. 1997. 
Equation (in.l) and (111.3) incorporate the effects of the population dynamics and 
the impact of changes in its genetic make-up. Changes in Nc] and Ncz can be the direct 
result of changes in the pest population's size or, indirectly, can be due to variations in 
the genetic fi-equency of resistant pests. As resistance increases, there is a decrease the 
effectiveness of the Bt toxins, so that a higher number of pests survives and damages the 
crop. Since our focus is resistance to Bt, we will assume that resistance to the spray 
pesticides used by the farmers planting conventional hybrids does not develop. This 
would be the case, for instance, if farmers rotated pesticides with different modes of 
action. The rate of interest used for the net present value of production is 4%. As noted 
above, the time horizon utilized is 15 years, which is a conservative estimate of the time 
in which backstop technologies will become available. 
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The mobility of the pest is parameterized by the percentage of the pest population 
on a field that moves to neighboring fields and then breeds with the local population. We 
will use here three levels of pest mobility: one pest out of ten thousand, one per one 
hundred thousand or one pest per million will leave the field. The mobility levels are 
very low because com borers are not very mobile. Note that such low mobility will tend 
to give conservative results in terms of resistance development, as it will limit the influx 
of susceptible pests into the Bt fields. 
Consistent with the field evidence (Dr. David Andow, personal communication), 
only first generation ECBs are modeled as moving outside the field^. TTiis form of 
effective pest mobility is de facto a reduced form embod>'ing two kinds of variables: the 
first is the pest mobility proper, as determined by biological and environmental factors, 
and the second is the farm size. The larger the field, the less likely pests are to create an 
externality by migrating fi-om one farm to the next, as they tend to live and mate within 
the perimeter of the field. 
We assume that pests will move only to adjacent fields. We will also assume that 
the grid of nine fields examined is representative of a larger production region that 
follows the same production practices. More specifically, we assume that the production 
characteristics of the nine fields examined are mirrored in the neighboring nine field 
groups. An example is given in Figure in.3, where the gray area in the center is the one 
actually analyzed in the simulations. This formulation has the advantage that the 
^ The reason for this appears to be that second generation pests have less of an incentive to leave their com 
field, since the com is at a later development stage and provides a better habitat. 
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positioning of fields in the grid becomes irrelevant, and the only variable that affects 
results is how many Bt fields there are in the grid, so as to allow us to concentrate on 
market penetration. The model is programmed in Matlab's simulation environment, 
Simulink. The averages for each scenario are calculated out of ICQ replications of the 15 
year time horizon runs. It is important to note that the cost of pesticide application per 
acre for the non-5/ fields represents just direct costs. It does not include the time that the 
farmer spends scouting for pests to determine the pest population levels. Therefore, the 
results presented below will generally underestimate the benefits of Bt com. 
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The darker areas in the Bt fields represent refuges. 
Figure in.3 - An example of the spatial grid used in the model 
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Results 
The results of the baseline case of zero mobility will also correspond to the zero 
and full market penetration cases. If all farmers plant non-Bt hybrids, no resistance to Bt 
will occur and profits will be determined by the efficacy of the sprayed pesticides and the 
modalities of their applications. If, on the other hand, all faraiers plant Bt com, the 
evolution of resistance will follow the same path as if only one farmer were planting Bt, 
acting in an isolated environment. 
In the baseline case of no pest mobility, the net present value per acre of planting 
Bt com for 15 years is SI300.85. There is little variability in the retums across the 
simulation mns, because the Bt toxins are extremely effective in killing the pests, and the 
population does not have time to recover in the 15 year time horizon considered. The 
average final frequency of resistance is 0.76, with a standard deviation of 0.29. As for 
the farmers planting a non-5/ hybrid, their profits will depend on the effectiveness of the 
pesticide they have at their disposal, and on the pest population dynamics. Table III.l 
shows how profits increase as the pesticide efficacy goes up. For any given pesticide 
efficacy, profits are always higher for the lower pest population, since the population 
causes less damage and requires fewer pesticide applications. 
The effect of an increase in pesticide efficacy is twofold. First, the number of 
applications to control first generation com borers increases, because the cost of 
application is the same but its productivity is higher. Second, the number of pesticide 
applications to control second generation com borers goes down as the first application's 
level of control increases. 
Table m. 1 - Average net present value of non-5f profits per acre with zero mobility 
Pesticide efficacy Dollars 
(percentage of pest population killed) 
1122.80 
70% (27.96) 
1161.62 
80% (24.04) 
1213.72 
90% (13.37) 
Standard deviations across simulation runs in parenthesis. 
Table in.2 - Average number of pesticide applications for the non-Bt farmers 
Pesticide efficacy l" generation 2"*^ generation 
(percentage of pest population killed) 
6.7 12.5 
70% (1.9) (1.3) 
7.6 9.2 
80% (1.8) (1.8) 
8.6 4.5 
90% (IJ) (L8) 
Standard deviations across simulation runs in parenthesis. 
Table in.2 reports the average numbers of times that spraying occurs for first and 
second generation borers, in the 15 year time fi-ame. For instance, a farmer who has at 
his disposal a pesticide with a 80% efficacy will spray on average 7.6 years out of 15 for 
first generation borers and 9.2 years out of 15 for second generation borers. The results 
reported in Table in.2 illustrate that the average pest populations used in the simulations 
are high. The reason for this choice is twofold. First, Bt adoption rates are likely to be 
higher where com borers pressure is intense, as the technology is more valuable to 
farmers: if the farmer had not adopted Bt, they would have had to spray very frequently, 
therefore their returns would have been substantially lower. Secondly, in terms of the 
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development of resistance, lower pest populations are not likely to exhibit a substantially 
different behavior, since the pest population will be lower in both the Bt and non Bt 
fields. 
The introduction of mobility has little effect on the profits of the Bt farmers. The 
reason for this is that the com borers moving into the Bt field from the non-i5/ fields tend 
to be susceptible to the Bt toxin, so the pests are killed off and are not able to cause any 
damage. Similarly, for the non-Bt farmers, profits are inelastic to changes in the level of 
market penetration for all levels of mobility considered. Returns depend only on the 
efficacy of the pesticides that farmers have at their disposal. The reason resides in the 
much lower pest population densities that are found in the Bt fields, in the relatively low 
levels of mobility considered in the simulations, and in the fact that the spray pesticides 
have a mode of action different from Bt, so they can easily kill the few resistant pests 
moving out of the Bt fields. 
As for resistance, with 20 % refuge in the Bt fields, there are no changes to the 
genetic make-up of the pest population in the rvon-Bt fields. This suggests that the spread 
of foci of resistance outside the Bt fields might become a concern only for very high 
levels of market penetration, and low compliance to the refuge recommendations. This 
does not imply that no resistance will develop in the Bt fields. As we will see next, this is 
not generally the case. It does however mean that resistance is probably going to be 
contained in the Bt fields, since very few resistant com borers will move out of the field. 
The small number that move to the non-5f areas will either mate with susceptible insects 
or be killed by the applications of spray pesticides. 
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In the Bt fields, resistance could very well develop, depending on the level of 
market penetration, the efficacy of the pesticide used in the non non-5/ areas, the level of 
mobility and of pest population pressures. Specifically, lower levels of mobility cause 
more resistance to develop, because of the isolation of resistant pests. Figure in.4 shows 
that resistance is not an issue for the two higher levels of pest mobility, since the higher 
levels of mobility introduce enough susceptible pests into the Bt fields to dilute the 
resistance genes. However, resistance could become a concern if mobility were very low. 
As Figure in.4 illustrates, for very low mobility, the final fi-equency of resistance would 
be higher than 0.1 for market penetration levels above 60%. It is important to note that 
neither market penetration nor pesticide efficacy play a role in the development of 
resistance for the higher levels of mobility: the absolute number of pests leaving the non-
Bt fields is always high enough to guarantee that resistance does not take hold. 
The proportion of resistant alleles stays low irrespective of the level of market 
penetration and pesticide efficacy for the highest levels of mobilit>'. Figure III.5 shows 
how the proportion of resistant alleles stays low irrespective of the level of market 
penetration and pesticide efficacy when mobility is 0.01%. More interestingly even, 
standard deviations are very low, and the final fi-equency of resistance is well below 0.01 
in all the simulation runs. Things are not substantially different if mobility decreases to 
0.001%, with two exceptions. Standard deviations increase substantially for the highest 
level of market penetration, and there is a positive, if low, probability that the final 
frequency of resistance might be high. For instance, if pesticide efficacy is 70%, the 
probability that the final fi-equency of resistance exceeds 0.1 is 0.0025. 
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Both pesticide efficacy and market penetration play a role in the lowest level of 
mobility analyzed here. Figure in.6 indicates that, if the Bt technology is utilized in half 
of the fields or so, resistance will increase substantially. Variances are very high as well, 
and they tend to increase as market penetration increases. Also, at this very low level of 
mobility, lower pesticide efficacy will actually facilitate the development of resistance, at 
relatively low levels of market penetration. The reason is that the lower efficacy of the 
pesticide will bring about higher numbers of susceptible com borers moving into the Bt 
fields. As they mate with resistant com borers, the number of heterozygotes increases. 
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As we discussed before, these results are much less worrisome than they might 
appear at first sight when we take into account that the very small population size will 
assure that the resistance is not transmitted to the non-Bt fields. The few resistant pests 
escaping from the Bt fields will either mate with susceptible pests or be killed off by the 
pesticides used by the non-Bt farmers, which have a mode of action different from Bt. 
This underscores the importance of the assumption we made that the farmers planting 
traditional hybrids do not use a ^/-based spray. If the non-5/ areas were sprayed with a 
5r-based pesticide, resistance might well spread from the transgenic planted fields. 
Conclusions 
In general, in the case of Bt com, the net outcome of the presence of externalities 
discussed in the previous chapter is clear. Farmers using traditional hybrids have a 
higher pest population which is highly susceptible to Bt. The negative externality 
produced by the net influx of these pests into the Bt fields is more than offset by the 
positive impact that the susceptible pests have on resistance buildup. On the other hand, 
the number of pests moving into the non-5r fields is very low and does not cause 
significant damage. 
The simulations' results in the various scenarios indicate some parameter levels at 
which the spread of resistance might become a concern. First off, the results are fairly 
robust in terms of the fact that resistance does not spread from the Bt to the non Bt fields, 
at least in the 15 year time horizon considered here. This is an important result, because 
it suggests that even if foci of resistance develop, they will be contained by the higher 
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population pressure in adjacent fields: the high dose concept does indeed work. 
Secondly, for the two higher levels of mobility considered - which are still very 
conservative in terms of how many com borers will move fi-om field to field, the Bt fields 
themselves do not become significantly resistant. 
To put the mobility parameters into perspective, let us consider some of the results of 
the Showers et al. paper mentioned in the introduction. According to the USDA (1999b), 
the average farm size in the US in 1997 was 436 acres, or 1.744 square kilometers. If we 
simplistically assume that the farms are square, they will have a side of about 1321 
meters. Showers and his co-authors, in 1986, released 283436 adult com borers at the 
beginning of the growing season^. They set up traps at 200, 800 and 3200 meters fi-om 
the release site. At the 3200 meter distance they retrieved 35 com borers, or 0.012% of 
the insects that had been released. Of course, caution is necessary in the use of these 
data. For instance, the Showers experiment set up the traps to retrieve the com borers in 
habitats different from com: in the specific case mentioned here, they were three 
combinations of brome and alfalfa and giant foxtail and a creek. Showers reports that 
habitat was a significant factor in determining the number of com borers retrieved. This 
indicates that com-from-com movements might have different characteristics from the 
ones Showers et al. report. The direction of flight also seems to be significant, and this 
could indicate that the dispersal is not as homogeneous as the simulations have assumed. 
Despite these caveats, however, the Showers results indicate that the levels of mobility 
® Showers et al. also released - and recaptured — com borers further into the growing season. However, the 
number of com borers retrieved at a distance greater than 1 km was always lower in the second release, 
indicating that com borers tend to move further away al the beginning of the season. 
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used in the scenarios discussed above are likely to be somewhat conservative. 
Market penetration plays a role at the lowest level of mobility, hi such a scenario, 
having over 50% of the fields planted with Bt com might be problematic. In general, the 
results on the frequency of resistance in the Bt fields are highly dependent on the level of 
pest mobility. This suggests more information is needed on the characteristics of the 
movement of the European Com Borer. The simulations presented here suggest other 
questions for future research. First of all, the grid size could be increased so as to analyze 
whether scale plays a role in the spread of resistance. In particular, in all the cases 
presented here the Bt fields were contiguous to at least one non--Sr fields. A finer grid 
could allow the exploration of the case of a less than complete market penetration with Bt 
fields being completely surrounded by Bt fields. Secondly, if mobility is very low, the 
assumption of random mating is likely to become less representative of the behavior of 
the pest population: the number of com borers in the Bt fields is very low, so it might 
happen that the resistant borers surviving in the Bt portion of the fields will tend to mate 
among themselves, as will the susceptible borers living in the refiige. Therefore, the 
possibility of non-random mating in the Bt fields should be taken into account and its 
impact on resistance development examined. Thirdly, the simulations suggest that 
compliance to the refuge recommendations might be critical to the preservation of 
susceptibility. The introduction of a compliance function could increase the significance 
of the model's results. 
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CHAPTER rv. 
OPTIMAL ANTIBIOTIC USAGE WITH RESISTANCE 
AND ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Introduction 
A recent review article on the New England Journal of Medicine stated that "the 
prevalence of antimicrobial-resistant human pathogens is rapidly increasing, but the 
discovery and development of new antimicrobial drugs that are active against multidrug-
resistant organisms have slowed dramatically" (Gold and Moellering, p. 1446). As Table 
IV. 1 shows, most of the antibiotic families known today were discovered in the 1940s, 
during the " antibiotic revolution" (Kingston). 
Table IV.l - Main antibiotic families and some of their characteristics 
FAMILY TYPE USAGE DATE OF 
FIRST 
DISCOVERY 
DATE OF 
FIRST 
USE 
Aminoglycosides Natural Antitubercolosis 1944 1946 
agents 
Cephalosporins Natural Broad spectrum 1945 1964 
Chloranphenicol Natural, Broad spectrum 1947 1949 
synthetic 
Macrolides Natural Pharyngitis, 1952 1950s 
pneumonia 
Oxazolidinones Synthetic Broad spectrum 1987 Undergoing 
human trials 
Penicillins Natural, Broad spectrum 1929 1942 
semi-synthetic 
Quinolones Synthetic Broad spectrum 1962 1960s 
Sulfonamides Synthetic Broad spectrum 1932 1935 
Tetracyclines Natural Broad spectrum 1947 1966 
Sources: Levy (1992), Encyclopaedia Britannica Online (2000a, 2000b), Diekema and 
Jones, Kingston. 
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More recently, discoveries have substantially slowed down; only one class, the 
quinolones, was discovered in the 1960s. A new class, the oxazolidinones, is presently 
undergoing clinical trials (Diekema and Jones). 
The problem of resistance is not limited to bacteria: it also affects the treatment 
of viruses such as the ones responsible for AIDS (Fauci), and disease carriers, such as 
the Anopheles mosquito which is a host for the malaria parasite. According to the World 
Health Organization and the World Bank, resistance is one of the main reasons why it has 
not been possible to eradicate malaria (World Health OrganizationAVorld Bank)'. 
The usage of these drugs" poses an impure public goods problem: utilization 
jointly generates a (positive) private characteristic, which depends exclusively on the 
individual's consumption of the chemical, and a (negative) public characteristic, that is, 
the reduction in susceptibility. The magnitude of the reduction depends on the sum of all 
the individuals' use, both in the present and in the past, as in the case of an accumulating 
form of pollution. Susceptibility has a common property nature because individual usage 
has a minimal impact on it, therefore individuals tend to ignore the effect that their 
actions have on resistance. Susceptibility is a scarce resource, and although resistance 
management plans that slow down resistance development are feasible, they can only 
reduce the impact of antibiotic usage on resistance development and not eliminate it. 
' Another instance of the importance of resistance is given by agricultural pesticides: according to the 
National Audubon Society, in 1993, 504 insect species were known to be resistant to at least one 
formulation of pesticide, while one hundred and fifty fungi and other plant pathogens had developed 
resistance to fungicides (Cate and Tinkle). As for weeds, 212 herbicide resistant weed biotypes were 
reported to be in existence in 1998 (Heap). 
- We will use the terms drug, antimicrobial and anubiotic interchangeably. 
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In a first best world, resistance buildup should affect optimal usage: benefits of 
antibiotic use in terms of improved health must be weighed against the costs of lower 
susceptibility in the future. Society also faces the decision of how many resources to 
invest in the discovery of new agents effective against the pest/microbe. Therefore, there 
is the need to examine the issues of resource allocation and availability of substitutes. 
The object of this paper is to explicitly identify the public nature characteristics of 
susceptibility in a dynamic setting and to characterize the optimal intertemporal usage 
problem from a social plaiuier perspective. This allows us to discuss two essential social 
welfare issues. The first is the optimal number of people to treat while susceptibility to 
an existing drug lasts, that is, the trade-off between present and future use of a drug. The 
second issue is how many resources to allocate to the development of new drugs. The 
allocation of effort for the development of alternative technologies is an important social 
welfare issue, particularly in the case of pharmaceutical products, since we are dealing 
with human health. The decision of how many resources to devote to research efforts 
aimed at discovering new chemical compounds will depend on these activities' relative 
costs and benefits. These costs and benefits will in turn be a function of both stock and 
flow variables, such as the production costs of the chemicals, the level of susceptibility of 
the existing resource and the overall amount of effort already spent on research. 
Similarly, the determination of the optimal number of people to whom to 
administer treatment is a significant issue, particularly because there is abundant 
anecdotal evidence of excessive and unnecessary usage of antimicrobials. According to 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, for instance, around a third of the 150 
12, 
million outpatient antibiotics prescribed each year are unneeded (as quoted in Levy, 
1998). Table rv.2 shows how in some countries antibiotic usage is much higher than in 
others, and includes a higher amount of broad spectrum antibiotics, for which the 
development of resistance is a greater concern. In Australia in particular, the situation 
has spurred various government inquiries (Doessel)^. 
Table IV.2 - Non-public sector' antibiotic sales in 1983 
COUNTRY DEFINED DAILY DOSE' /1,000 
POPULATION 
/DAY 
BROAD/NARROW 
RATIO 
Sweden 7.01 1.72 
UK 9.36 4.03 
Canada 11.64 2.74 
USA 13.22 2.07 
Australia 17.12 4.69 
' Non-public sector sales excludes in-hospital use. 
~ The Defined Daily Dose is an aggregate measure of usage that allows comparisons. 
Source: Doessel, 1998. 
Research on substitute technologies can be subdivided into two types: research 
on compounds similar to those already known, and basic research on new alternative 
technologies. The objective of the first type of activity is to discover antibiotics (or 
pesticides) that use a similar mode of action to those already known. This type of 
^ In agricultiue, there exists a corresponding problem. Because of the mobility of the pest population and 
the common property nature of susceptibility, farmers may exhibit myopic behavior towards the future 
development of resistance which results in overapplication of the pesticide. In case of overutilization of the 
chemicals, be they antimicrobials or pesticides, the first step is to determine optimal usage to help devise 
policies that reduce suboptimal utilization. 
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research is likely to involve a lower degree of uncertainty, since the existing drug 
provides a blueprint for scientists. Examples are the development of the semi-synthetic 
methicillin from penicillin, and the discovery of various pesticides all belonging to the 
same family, such as the chlorinated hydrocarbons, which includes DDT, dieldrin and 
endrin. 
In most of these cases, there is likely to be cross-resistance between the old and 
new compounds. Cross-resistance occurs when the development of resistance to a 
compound also confers at least partial resistance to another chemical, so that the second 
chemical is less effective than it would have been if it had been used first. The likelihood 
of cross-resistance depends on the fact that the chemicals have a similar mode of action 
or a resembling structure (Levy, 1992). 
In the case of antibiotics, cross-resistance causes multidrug resistance to occur. 
This is a particularly dangerous phenomenon, because it can become impossible to treat 
an illness. The present emergence of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis worldwide is a case 
in point (Cohn et ai). Cross-resistance is particularly worrisome in antibiotics because 
resistance is transmitted from one strain of bacteria to another"*, so that multidrug 
resistance in bacteria is the rule rather than the exception (Levy, 1992). Resistance has 
developed to all known antimicrobial drugs (Gold and Moellering), while, as we saw, the 
discovery of new classes of antibiotics has slowed dowTi since the 1950s, so this problem 
is particularly important in terms of policy. According to the American Society for 
This occurs via mobile pieces of DNA, called plasmids or transposons, which move from a bacterium to 
another and become part of the new host's genetic material. 
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Microbiology (ASM), we are in an "incipient public health emergency, albeit one that is 
poorly appreciated and recognized"(ASM, p. 4)^. 
Resources can also be invested is the discovery of novel technologies, for which 
cross resistance is not likely to be an issue. For example, vaccines are a cost effective 
alternative to antibiotics. Other possible alternatives include both biospecific antibodies, 
which support the body's immune system in eliminating microbes by itself, and bacteria-
attacking viruses (Nemecek)^. 
In broad terms, the discovery of novel active ingredients and treatments is likely 
to involve a higher degree of pure research than the discovery of new antibiotics or 
pesticides that use a similar mode of action to those already known. Nowadays most 
pharmaceutical and chemical companies maintain substantial in-house research 
facilities^, and the traditional dichotomy of public sector/pure research and private 
sector/applied research is not clear-cut. However, the discovery of totally new 
compounds is likely to involve a high level of basic research, and this might have 
implications on both private and public research priorities and activities. 
Both in the case of pests and in that of microorganisms, susceptibility could be 
modeled either as a non-renewable or as a renewable resource. The choice impinges on 
^ In the case of pesticides, the transmission of resistance occurs only via reproduction, so the time path of 
resistance development is easier to predict, and multipesticide resistance is not the norm. However, cross-
resistance is a concem at the core of the policy debate nowadays, as it is the rationale for the Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) unprecedented policy of mandatory refuges for Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) plant 
pesticides, genetically engineered to produce pesticides (EPA, 1998a). 
" In the pesticide field, novel pesticides, which combine lower toxicity for humans and alternative modes of 
actions, range firom chemical modifiers of development and behavior (pheromones, growth regulators) to 
artificial analogues of natural elements, such as the chloronicotinyls (from nicotine) to insect-tolerant plants 
and genetically modified crops (Pedigo). 
^ See Gambardella for the pharmaceutical industry and Hammock and Soderlund for the pesticide industry. 
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the relative fitness of the resistant individuals compared to the susceptible ones. Should 
there be a fitness cost for the resistant organisms, they would tend to disappear once the 
usage of the chemical selecting for them had been stopped. There appears to be evidence 
that resistant bacteria do not suffer fi-om any fitness cost (Stewart et al.)^. 
Limited literature exists on the common property nature of susceptibility in the 
case of antibiotics. Tisdell provides a basic analysis, even though he fi-ames the issue in 
terms of a prisoner's dilemma and not as a problem of the commons. Brown and Layton 
analyze the externalities involved in the use of antibiotics focussing on the trade-off 
involved in the usage of antibiotics as growth promoters for animals. Both farmers and 
sick individuals choose the optimal level of medication taking resistance as given, 
thereby overutilizing the antibiotic. Laxminarayan and Brown examine how to optimally 
utilize two antibiotics with different impacts on resistance, without incorporating the 
development of backstop technologies, in a problem similar that of the mining of various 
deposits of ore of different quality. Kile models the R&D expenditure in the private 
sector as a function of resistance. He finds some evidence that increases in the levels of 
resistance have a positive impact on the level of R&D expenditure, the rationale being 
that higher levels of resistance shorten the life span of existing drugs, so that their 
producers need to find alternative products. 
Even though the economics literature has not focussed on antibiotics use in 
optimal planning models, there is a large body of work on issues of common property and 
® As for pests, there are various instances of lack of fitness costs, see for instance Andrews and Morrison, 
Croft and Whalon, Penrose, and Romero and Sutton. 
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externalities in relation to exhaustible resources. Kamien and Schwartz (1982) provide 
an excellent literature review. 
An extensive amount of economics literature, spurred by the energy crisis of the 
early '70s, has analyzed the issues related to the use of a nonrenewable resource when the 
discovery of backstops is uncertain. Dasgupta and Heal's seminal paper (1974) analyzes 
the problem when there is uncertainty on the date of discovery of the new, 
nonexhaustible technology (and not on its characteristics). The probability of the 
discovery date is exogenous, and there are no investment efforts. They prove that in 
certain circumstances the uncertainty is formally equivalent to an increase in the discount 
rate. Kamien and Schwartz (1978) and Dasgupta, Heal and Majumdar extend the model 
to endogenize the level of investment which accelerates the time of discovery of the new 
technology. Davison uses essentially the same framework for the case in which the 
probability of discovering a backstop is a fimction of the flow of R&D and not its stock. 
In the next pages, we will develop an expected utility model with heterogeneous 
individuals and we will apply some of the approaches developed in the energy literature 
to determine the optimal time path for the depletion of susceptibility to an existing drug 
and to discuss the characteristics of the discovery process. We will assume that 
technological change is endogenous and analyze the dynamics of research in backstop 
technologies both in a certain and in an uncertain world. 
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The basic framework 
For individuals taking an antibiotic, the dose is exogencusly given by the doctor 
or the manufacturer. Therefore, we treat the choice of individual drug use as a discrete 
choice problem. Individuals are heterogeneous in their need for treatment, which allows 
analysis of the marginal impact of each treatment, the optimal number of individuals 
treated and the externalities created by the increase in resistance induced by usage. 
We will use the expected utility framework (Evans and Viscusi) to examine the 
issue of optimal use of antibiotics. We will also show how the model can be easily 
utilized for the case of pesticides. Preferences are quasilinear. Utility derived from the 
consumption of good x is contingent on good health, while utility obtained from the 
numeraire good 3; is independent of health. Therefore, each agent's utility is of the form: 
a(x') + v', where a' > 0,a" <0, and lim a(x) = 00. We can think of good x as any good SX-^ 
that requires good health to provide positive utility: in bad health, the utility derived 
from .r is zero (Fuchs and Zeckhauser). 
The economy is either based on endowments or is such that the supply of labor is 
fixed over time: each individual / is given an identical endowment/wage m at each time t.  
In each time period each individual also faces a lump sum tax T to finance activities that 
prevent the buildup of resistance and the research in backstop technologies. We limit 
ourselves to the case in which T is identical for everybody. This is consistent with the 
public nature of susceptibility, and with the fact that the level of infection is independent 
of agents' actions. Alternatively, we could think that taxes are set ex ante, before people 
get sick, and, ex ante, individuals are identical in every respect. 
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Individuals maximize instantaneous utility. As discussed in more detail below, 
individuals cannot use their past sickness as a predictor for the future and the 
development of resistance has a public good nature, thus each individual takes the 
existing stock of susceptibility E as given and his/her contribution to resistance 
development as negligible. There is no 'golden glow' effect on the part of untreated 
individuals with respect to the health levels of others in the economy, and susceptibility 
has no option value. We define treatment for individual / as e' = 1 and the no treatment 
case as e' = 0, with as the price of the antibiotic. We assume that the marginal cost of 
production, x. is constant, and the pharmaceutical industry is perfectly competitive', so 
that p = 
The budget constraint for each agent is then x' + y' -irz + pe' = m . We can then 
rewrite the utility function as cir(x') + m-jc'-pe'— r Agents maximize expected 
utility: 
EU' = Pr(healthy)[a(x') + m- x' — pe' - + Pr(sick) [/n — x' -  pe' — rj, and 
EU' = Pr(healthy)a(x' ) + m — x' — pe' -  v. 
More specifically, we assume that the probability of being healthy for untreated 
agents is determined by an exogenous parameter 9' eN,^' which represents 
' The pharmaceutical industry is also myopic in its behavior towards resistance, since £ is a public good. 
This is a simplification in the case of patented drugs, but it reflects reality for older drugs. 
" We will not concern ourselves with non-negativity constraints fory. 
It would be possible to choose a more con^lex distribution that puts some mass at 0'. This would not 
change the quality of the results. 
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the severity of the infection. At 0, the agent is healthy, at n he is the sickest in the 
population, which has size n+\. We assume that the sicker a person is, the less likely he 
is to recover without treatment. Therefore, the probability is a function of 6: pr(no 
recovery) = p(^), with p'(^) > 0, and pr(recovery) = 1- p(0). In particular, to calculate 
0' 0' 
explicit results, we will assume that pr(no recovery) = — and pr(recovery) = 1 ^. 
n' n' 
We will also assume that, in each period of time, the probability that a particular 
individual is assigned a certain 6' is independent of the 0' of the previous period, so that 
neither the government nor the agents can use past sickness as a predictor'^. This 
formulation therefore implies that the level of resistance each individual faces at any 
point in time is the same and independent from each person's medical history. This is 
consistent with the fact that resistance spreads easily from one bacterium to another 
(Levy, 1992). Therefore, we can write: 
EU'{ni,e') = 
( 
1 r 
n- Q-
a(x') + — 0 + m -x' -t  = a(x') + m-x' -  r . (IV. 1) 
H* n' 
If agents receive treatment for their infection, their expected utility is no longer a 
function of the severity of the infection. Recovery depends on whether the infecting 
mechanism is susceptible to the treatment. The higher the level of susceptibility, the 
higher the probability of recovery. We normalize the stock of susceptibility E to the 
Alternatively, we could interpret this as having a stationary population of size n with individuals living 
only one time period. 
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[0. T-l] interval, and assume that the probability of recovering is 
n lii(2) 
probability of no recovery is 1 - ^ . If the treatment is effective, once again 
n ln(2) 
U' = a{x' ) + m-x'-p-T. If the treatment does not work, utility from x  once again 
equals zero. Therefore: 
EU'{m, e ' )  =  ln(l + E) 
n ln(2) [A(,Y') + m-x' - /7-R] + 1 -
ln(l + £) 
n ln(2) [O + m — x' — - r J, 
and EU' (m, 0')= ) + m - x' -  p — r. 
n ln(2) av.2) 
The agents' maximization then consists of a discrete choice problem: 
EU' (m, 6' ,e' = 1) = a(x') + m — x' -p — r. 
versus 
EU'im,G'e' = 0) = 
n ln(2) 
0'  ^  0' 0' 
1 -\ a{x') + —rO + w-x' = a{x') ) + m- x' -  r, 
n' I n' n' 
if ln(l + E) .1 A — — — a i x  ) - p > a ( x )  r o c i x  )  = >  e  = 1, and 
n ln(2) n' 
. . I n C l + E )  .  ^ is ^ • r,  if —— — a i x  ) - p < a ( x )  r O c ( x  )  = >  e  =  0.  
/iln(2) n* 
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0  ^Therefore, for agents with a serious infection, for whom pr(sickness) = > 1, 
n 
treatment will be worthwhile even if the efficacy of the treatment is low. More 
specifically, for the sickest individual in the population, for whom pr(sickness) = 1, it will 
always be worthwhile to undergo treatment as long as cc(x' )>/?''*: 
n ln(2) 
EU' {m,n,e' = 1) = ^ a{x') + m - x' -  p — t  > EU'{m,n,e' =0) = ni —x' —T. 
tt ln(2) 
In a world of decentralized choices, the marginal individual (we assume the 
equality will hold for one person) is the one for whom: 
ln(l + £) . ^ -N ^7 / .X 1. • 
— a{x )- p = a{x ) —'-a{x ), that is, 
n ln(2) n' 
In the case of pesticides, this basic framework could be used to analyze the behavior of risk-neutral 
farmers who receive an endowment m in each time period and whose crops are produced by a composite 
input X via a concave production function a. The application of pesticides can be considered a discrete 
problem, either because the farmers follow the recommended dosage instructions or because they do not 
have a choice over the dosage, as in the case of the recently introduced Bt crops, which are genetically 
engineered to produce a pesticide. We indicate the level of infestation by B, the stock of susceptibility as 
£•€[0, 2"-!], the cost of the pesticide application as p and the efficacy of the pesticide, a function of 
susceptibility, as Then the expected profits have the same form as the expected utilities 
/iln(2) 
specified above. 
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In this simple formulation, we are ignoring the fact that, at least in Western 
countries, antibiotics are not available over the counter, and a doctor is needed to 
prescribe the medicine. One simple way to accommodate this would be to introduce a 
floor on the level of 0' below which doctors will not treat the patient, Given the 
evidence of antibiotics over-prescription discussed in the introduction, however, it is 
reasonable to assume that in practice this constraint does not bind, dp > 0]. 
The stock of susceptibility to antibiotics or pesticides used until time t,  denoted by 
£•, is such that its behavior through time can be described by the following equation of 
motion: 
Where co is the marginal impact of individual usage on resistance development, 
and P is the amount spent in resistance management activities such as education on the 
risks of resistance. The preventive activity is financed by the lump sum taxes T levied on 
each individual in the community, so that (n + 1)T= P. In the medical literature, activities 
that could be included in P range from ex ante prevention to ex post containment of the 
infection (Murray). They include: education on the risks of resistance and on the 
appropriate use of the chemical; techniques through which the chemical is put to use such 
as 1,3, or 10 days antibiotic cycles (ex ante), and containment of the infection or of the 
resistant pest population (expost). 
E = (IV.3) 
P + 1 
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This specification follows Brown and Layton in that the effect of antibiotic usage 
on the stock of susceptibility is linear. We will discuss some of the consequences of a 
nonlinear specification later. This characterization of the problem's dynamics indicates 
that the increase in resistance taking place in each period affects only the future 
effectiveness of the antibiotic. This lag is due to the fact that resistance takes some time 
to spread. 
In this formulation, if there is no usage of the chemical, resistance management is 
ineffective. The reason is that resistance management is not independent fi-om utilization 
of the drug, being essentially a way to minimize the impact of usage on the development 
of resistance. This will insure that the stock of susceptibility E is effectively a 
nonrenewable resource and that at each point in time, E is such that£' < E^, where E^ is 
the initial stock of the resource. We are implicitly assuming that the level of preventive 
activity P is always as high as possible. The rationale for this is twofold. First, the 
effects of preventive activities are certain and immediate, and the benefits derived fi-om a 
correct use of antibiotics are not limited to the slowing down of resistance, but include 
better health for the individuals treated. Taking a course of antibiotics correctly improves 
a patient's chances of recovery besides reducing resistance buildup. Secondly, P is in 
practice of limited effectiveness and cannot eliminate the development of resistance, so 
an analysis of its dynamics is of limited interest. 
Increases in the antibiotic price p, will decrease the niunber of people taking the 
medicine, since if Pa> p^^• 
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= ,1 , and 
V a(.r') Hln(2) 
= „ /i^_£^_ln(l±£l 3^ 
V «^(^') "ln(2) 
\ or(j:') /iln(2) y ar(;c') /iln(2) 
This is an expected result. It indicates that the magnitude of the change in p that 
would be needed to bring down overuse depends on —, the real price of the medicine 
ar(x') 
in utility terms. If income is large compared to the cost of the antibiotic, as is typically 
the case in Western countries, very large increases in price will be needed to substantially 
decrease overuse. 
In a decentralized world, there is overuse of the antibiotic, but usage decreases 
with time as efficacy decreases. The socially optimal marginal individual (we assume the 
equality will hold for one person) is the one for whom: 
^(l + E) , o) ,  ,  ,A , 
— a{x = a(x )—'rOc(x ), that is, 
«ln(2) P + 1 n' 
_ r ^ ln(l + E) A 0, =n /l H • 
yj a(x') /iln(2) a(x')(P + l) 
And it is evident that: 
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^ _ L p ln(l + £) e,  >e,  =n j i  + —^ 
' ' V «ln(2) 
This is similar to Brown and Layton's characterization. The difference between 
the social optimum and the decentralized case is given by the shadow value of 
CO 
susceptibility times the individual effective impact of usage on resistance, 
weighted by the utility of consuming good x,a(x') . The higher the utility derived from 
the consumption of good x which might be foregone if the agent is sick, the closer 6$ is to 
df, since the benefits of using the antibiotic in the present (the costs of delaying usage) are 
higher. As for the decrease in usage in the decentralized case. 
A0, I_ 
AE 2 ln(2Xl + E) a{x') n ln(2) 
< 0 .  
First scenario: no substitutes to the antibiotic 
We start by discussing the simplest case. In this scenario, there are no alternatives 
to the antibiotic, and resistance management is the only activity that can slow down the 
mining of susceptibility. This is not necessarily a realistic scenario, since it assumes that 
no technological change is possible, but it is useful in setting the stage of the problem. 
The social planner seeks to maximize'^: 
Note that this maximization indicates the lack of credit markets for both the government and individual 
agents. 
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Max J y_EU'(untreated) + y £(y'(treated) 
0 '=0 '=r-i 
s,., £ = 
P + I 
Assuming that n is large, so that the proportion of population not taking the drug, 
y^n, can be treated as a continuous variable, and remembering that 
=  — K { K  +  \ ) { 2 K  + 1), we can reformulate the problem as: 
•=i  6 
r w-i 
Max y £"6^' (untreated) + ^  £t/'(treated). 
We can rearrange the maximand: 
I 1 - -e  
- \ 
n  
a(x' ) + m — x' - r ln(l + £) 
/ibi(2) a(x' ) + m-x' - p — T 
y ( v  +  l ) ( 2 r  +  l )  I n r i H - ^ )  
+  / /  l a  +  ( r  +  \ X m - x - - T ) +  \  \ n - y ) a  
6n' n ln(2) 
Hn - r)(m -x' - p - T )  =  
y ( y  +  l ) ( 2 y  +  l )  ln(l + £') ( /  +  l ) a  —  ,  a  +  —  ( n  - / ) a  +  ( n  +  l ) ( m  - x ' )  -  p ( n  - y ) - i n  +  l ) r  
6M" n  ln(2) 
>'(y + l)(2r + l) ln(l + £') ( 7  +  l ) a - ^ ^ ^  / /  ^-a+ \  \n-r)a + (n + l)(m-x-)-p(n-r)-P. 
on' n m(2) 
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It is worthwhile noting that in this problem the presence of a positive discount rate 
for the future, r, is a debatable assumption. As Ramsey wrote, the discounting of future 
generations is "ethically indefensible and [originating] merely from the weakness of the 
imagination" (Ramsey, p. 543). We can view this as a general formulation of the 
problem that allows for the particular case of r = O"^. The present value Hamiltonian is 
then: 
( r  + 1 ) «  +  ( „  _  +  ( n  +  l ) i m  - x ' ) -  p ( n - y ) - P  e  
6n' n ln(2) 
H = 
coin - y) 
-n 
-n- p + i 
We rewrite the Hamiltonian in terms of the proportion of people treated: 
n 
—  n  + 1 \ a  —  -
n  
y ^ln(l + £) 
n  —  —  n  
n j 
^ r ^ 
2-/2 + 1 
6n' 
•a 
O) 
e  - n -
a  +  { n  +  \ ) { m - x ' ) - p \ n - - n  
n  l n ( 2 )  n  J  
F ^ ) 
n n 
V n J 
P + 1 
r  
-p 
We can simplify this to: 
Note that a negative discount rate could be advocated in this context, since the future generations will 
necessarily be poorer than the present ones, as the stock of susceptibility at their disposal is lower. See 
Goodin for arguments against the use of discounting, particularly when human health is concerned. 
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f  — n  +  l l a  
V" J 
1_l' ) 3 ' 2 ' ' 6« a - P  
+ 
ln(2) n  +  ( n  +  l ) ( m  -  x ' )  -  p n  \  nj (IV.4) 
-/i-
nco\ 1-^ 
nJ 
P + 1 
TTie first order conditions are: 
0 = dH 
- V 
C ' /  n  
na - n  +  
n  
_1_ 
6/1 
ln(l + £•) 
a ^ a + tip 
ln(2) e'" + nn 
CO 
P + 1 
(IV.5) 
= 
P + 1 
<o 
- a  +  f L  n  +  'r: 
v« J 6« 
a In(l + £:) 
—  +  — i  - a -  p  
n  n  ln(2) e , (IV.6) 
/^ = - dH 
dE K nj 
a 
(l + £)In(2) (IV.7) 
PROPOSITION 1 - The proportion of untreated people increases over time if the 
discount rate is positive. 
PROOF: 
We take the derivative of (IV.6) with respect to time, and equate it to (IV.7): 
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P + I 
C O  
2 \ L  
n  
« + l 
< n )  
a coin-/) 
P + 1 
- r  >i - a  + 
C O  
FL n  +  I-
^ n j  
«(1 + E) ln(2) P + 1 
1 
re 
6 n  
a ln(l + £) 
— i  - a -  p  > - e  
n  n  ln(2) 
and since fu = — dH 
dE 
1 - 2 1  a 
n ; (1 + £) ln(2) e'", we can write: 
2 i 
_ 
[ " J  
n  +  \  E.\L 
n \ n j  
= r< —a + n  +  {-^
n )  6 n  
a ln(l + £:) 
— + — -a - p 
n  n  ln(2) (IV.8) 
This result implies that, if the discount rate is zero, the optimal policy is to have a 
constant percentage of population receiving treatment through time. The level of social 
welfare will however decrease over time as the efficacy of the antimicrobial declines. If, 
on the other hand, /- > 0, (-] > 0, as the term in brackets is positive. 
Note that the result that y  =  0  for r = 0 is independent from the specification of 
the dynamics of resistance, but it does depend on resistance development being linear. 
We could see resistance buildup as exponential, since resistance in bacteria is not 
transferred only via reproduction, but also through gene exchange. Therefore, "One 
surviv[ing bacterium] can produce new copies of itself, as well as recruit new resistant 
neighbors" (Levy 1992, p.78), and resistance spreads faster as more people are treated. If 
exp[£o(n — y)] 
the erosion of susceptibility is specified as £ = ^^, individual use has 
P + 1 
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increasingly high costs in terms of resistance. In this case, the optimal policy would be to 
increase the proportion of untreated people through time, even if the discount rate is zero. 
Therefore, the conclusion that, when the discount rate is zero, the optimal policy is to 
have a constant percentage of the population receiving treatment is a conservative one. 
Second scenario: the existence of certain exhaustible substitutes 
In this case, we will assume that there exists an alternative technology to the 
original antibiotic. Specifically, it is possible to develop another antibiotic, which is 
superior technologically to the existing one because it mines susceptibility more slowly 
than the original one. That is, the new chemical has a lower impact on resistance: 
co^ >0},, where ty, is the impact of the old technology on resistance and <y, is the impact 
of the new one. The development of this substitute is certain, but it requires investment 
in a capital stock. The structure of this model is similar to that of the second model 
y developed by Vousden in the case of oil. We have three control variables: —, the 
n  
g 
proportion of people treated with the new chemical, —, and the level of investment, /, 
n  
and two state variables, E and the capital stock K. Investment increases capital, so that 
K  =  f { I ) ,  and /' > 0,/" < 0, and investment presents increasing marginal costs because 
of the nature of the research and development process, so the cost of investment, gil), is 
such that g' > 0, g" > 0. Because of the quasilinearity of the utility functions, the 
formulation is the same whether we assume that agents treated with the newer antibiotics 
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still pay the same price p and the government finances the difference or whether agents 
pay the full price for the newer treatment. Initially, the costs of using a new drug are very 
high: clinical trials require expensive Food and Drug Administration approvals, and are 
conducted by highly trained medical personnel. In addition to that, the production of new 
drugs itself is often very costly. As more resources are invested in the research of the 
new drug, costs decline. Therefore, we model the cost of the new antibiotic as an 
increasing function of the number of people treated with it, 5, and a decreasing function 
of the level of capital K: c(6, K), such that ci(6, K) > Q, ciip, K) < Q, cn(6, ^ > 0, 
ciiib, K)>Q, ci2(d, < 0 for 5 and K>0, c(o, 0) = C2(6, 0) = oc^ and c(0, K) = ci(0, K) = 
cii(0, K) = Q. Note that there is no capital depreciation, so the non-negativity constraint 
for capital is always satisfied. For simplicity, we will assume that KQ = 0. The social 
planner problem is then; 
X 
Max I 
n n 
— n +  1  l a  -
n 
I 
'y_: 3 n 
-J- " 1 + 
3 2 6 n  
a 
ln(2) 
+(n + l)(w -  x ' ) -  p  
a 
r y \ 
n— — n 
n 
- ? - c  — n,K 
\n 
- g { I )  
• e ^ d t .  
s.t. 
E = 
(  y  5  
-co^ n n n [ n n — n yn ) 
P + 1 
K  =  f { i y  
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The Hamiltonian is: 
+ 1 a  —  
H  =  
+(rt + 1)(/?J -  x ) -  p  
n  
3" 
r 
r V l ^ f  r  
2 nj 6 n  a + 
lnO + £)fi_2:^ 
n - ^ n  l - P - c  
n  
ln(2) 
- g ( n  
n  
a  
7 5  \  
-co, n n n 
n  
CO, ( 5  —  n  
\ n  7  
P + 1 
(IV.9) 
The first order conditions are: 
0 = d H  
o/--
n a  - « 
r y \  
y 6 n  
ln(l + E )  
a  - a  +  n p  
ln(2) e' + /un P + 1 (TV. 10) 
that is, jj = 
d H  
P + 1 
CO, 
- a -  p - k - n + 
"J 6 n  
a  ln(l + £) 
—  +  —  - a  
n  n  ln(2) e  ,  
0 > - —  =  - g V ) e - " + v f V ) ,  
cl 
0 ^ 4J7 = 
o V 
f X 
- n , K  
n  
e'" -^jin 6>, - co, 
P + 1 
(TV.ll) 
(IV. 12) 
(IV. 13) 
o H  ^  =  - —  =  -
o E  
d H  u = = c, 
d K  
_ y _  
V. n  J  
a  
(l + £)ln(2) 
fx \ 
- n , K  
\n 
(TV. 14) 
(IV. 15) 
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Note that (IV.IO) is the same condition as in the first scenario (no technological 
change) as long as a) = co^ (see equation (IV.5)). 
If —nc. 
\.n 
— n,K\e"'-^fun——^ = 0 , then fu = 
P + 1 
P + l 
<y, -oj. {'-n,K \n 
PROPOSITION 2 - The dynamic path of the proportion of untreated people is the same 
as in the first scenario if the impact of the existing antibiotic on resistance is the same 
(^co = co.^). This is due to the fact that the optimal policy is independent fi-om the 
distribution of wealth. 
PROOF: 
We take the derivative of (FV.IO) with respect to time, and equate it to (IV.11): 
P + 1 
CO, n) / J +  1  nj 
a -7) 
P-r 1 
- / -  <  - a  +  (O, 
fd = - d H  
d E  
f-T 
x - L  
n + f-' 
a 
+ • 
n(l + £:)ln(2) P + 1 
1 
i - e  
6n 
a ln(l + £) , 
— I - a  —  p  y e ' " ,  and also, 
n n ln(2) 
«;(! + £) ln(2) e'", therefore 
{-
V" J 
n + \ — I = r'!-a + i l l  (-
6 n  
a ln(l + £) 
— + — -a - p 
n n ln(2) (IV. 16) 
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PROPOSITION 3 - Investment declines over time if the discount rate is zero. If the 
discount rate is positive, the time path of investment will depend on the importance that 
the stock of capital has on the reduction in the cost of producing the new drug. 
PROOF: 
Investment will not start as long as g '(O)e'" > u/'(0). Once g = 0: 
[/•(/)]- /•(/) 
[ n i ) t  
g ••(/)/'(/)-g •(/)/"(/) c . { 5 , K )  +  r ^ ^  /•(/) (IV.17) 
%/ T\ 
If \ c A 5 , K ) \  >  r — —investment will decline over time. In this case, since the 
' - ' /'(/) 
benefits of investment are certain, the level of investment will be initially high, so that its 
benefits can be captured as soon as possible, and then taper off. 
The start of investment will not in general coincide with the beginning of use of 
the new technology. The date at which sufficient capital has been accumulated to make 
use of the new technology economically viable will depend on the structure of the cost 
function c. Specifically, treatment with the new technology will be delayed as long as 
c, > levels of capital stock, the marginal cost of treating even 
very few patients is high, adoption of the technology will be deferred. Figure IV.l 
suggests a possible cost structure. For levels of capital below KQ, the cost of treatment is 
prohibitively high. 
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c 
K 
Figure IV. 1 — A possible structure of the cost function for the new technology 
PROPOSITION 4 - The time path of the proportion of agents treated with the new 
antibiotic depends on the net effect of a capital increase in the cost of administering the 
new drug and the impact of the use of the new drug on resistance. 
PROOF: 
We rearrange (IV. 13) and take its derivative with respect to time, and equate it to (IV.l 1): 
P + 1 
CO, - co. 
- n , K  
n J 
n  + c,. 
^5 ^ 
- n , K  
yn J n n - r c ,  
- n , K  
\ n  J  
e'", and 
// = - c H  
BE V nj 
a  
(l + £)ln(2) e'", therefore 
\ n j  
c , ,  -... c, CO. - CO. 
c,,/i P + 1 
a 
/I jc„rt(l4-£")ln(2) (IV. 18) 
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The long run behavior of the percentage of population treated with the new 
technology will depend on the difference between the reduction in costs brought about by 
a capital increase and the net effect of the use of the new drug on resistance buildup. 
Figure IV.2 shows a possible path for the portion of people treated with the old and new 
Figure rv.2 - Treatment with a positive discount rate in the second scenario 
In this case, since the number of untreated people keeps increasing, as does the 
number of people treated with the second antibiotic, we must have that the slope of the 
• • 
latter is flatter, or ^ . If, on the other hand, the discount rate for the future were zero, 
the number of untreated people would be constant but the number of people treated with 
the new antibiotic might still increase through time, albeit more slowly (see (IV. 18)). 
chemical, with a positive interest rate, and > 0 globally. 
n-r! 
5 -> 
98 
Third scenario: uncertain nonexhaustible substitutes 
In this scenario, the discovery a backstop technology is not certain, and the 
probability of developing a new (nonexhaustible) technology is endogenous, depending 
positively on the cumulative amount of R&D effort. We suppose that the new 
technology is a real breakthrough, so that it renders the stock of susceptibility remaining 
at the time of the discovery worthless. A good example would be the discovery of 
"biospecific antibodies", which recognize harmful bacteria and take them to the human 
cells that can eliminate them (Nemecek). Define T as the time at which the new 
technology becomes available, and W as the maximum social welfare possible after the 
new technology is discovered: 
W = max f Zt/' 
r V '=1 
- r U - T )  d t .  (IV. 19) 
As we said above, the probability of discovering a backstop technology is 
endogenous, and depends positively on the cumulative amount of R&D effort. Define 
the level of R&D in each time period as I, and the cumulative level of R&D, or stock of 
knowledge capital, as K. We will assimie that the dynamic relationship between stock 
and flow of knowledge has the same structure as in the previous scenario: 
K  =  g ( I ) ,  
s.t. K ( 0 )  = 0, /(O) = 0,/ • > 0, and/ " < 0. 
(IV.20) 
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We define the probability of discovering the backstop as <I>{K). (p{K) is such 
that (0) = 0, <p '(0) = 0, ^'^0, and lim ^ (z) = 1 This is the same structm-e of the R&D 
function specified in Kamien and Schwartz (1978). The probability of discovering the 
new technology in the interval d t  equals =  ( p \ K { t ) ) K { t ) d t  =  ( f > ' { K { t ) ) f { I ) d t .  
In their seminal 1974 paper, Dasgupta and Heal prove that if = 0, as we have 
assumed here, a certain kind of certainty equivalence results, so that the maximization 
can be rewritten as: 
Max I 
ft 
^n + 1 
n 
a-
J 
Y_ 
nj 
ln(l + £) 
ln(2) V nJ 
n 
— + 
3 
a 
r 
- ( «  +  l ) ( m  - x ) -  p  
1 
2 Uj 6/1 
-P-g(/) 
n , 
a 
{ \ - ( f , { K ) ) ^ < P  e - d t ,  
s.t. 
-co n - L n  
E = 
P + 1 
K  =  f { I )  
(multiplier //), and 
(mul t ip l i er  T J ) .  
Y The optimal control problem has two control variables: — and I, and two state 
n 
variables, E and K. In general terms, utilization of the antibiotic shall cease in finite time 
at, say, T* since the susceptibility that makes it effective is nonrenewable. The presence 
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of uncertainty might modify the optimal T*, but, since the discovery of a backstop in the 
period [0, T*] cannot be guaranteed, it might be the case that the susceptibility of the 
antibiotic is exhausted before an alternative technology is invented. We define the social 
welfare flmction before the introduction of the backstop as: 
^  V  
- J , E  
\n y 
f 
a -
y  
''A \ n j  
n 
— + 
3 \ n )  2  
1  f 1  
— +  
y " J  6n 
a 
In(2) I n, a 
+ ( n  +  l ) i m  -  x )  -  p  n  n -P-g(/). 
V n 
Then the Hamiltonian is: 
H (1 \ K ) f i I W ^  e - " + M  
-co Y n n 
V n 
P + 1 
+ 7/(/) 
The first order conditions are; 
0 = dH 
c 
na - 21 n + 'r: 
nj 6/1 
ln(l + E) 
a -a + tip 
ln(2) (IV.21) 
ca 
P + 1 
0  ^  V  =  [ - ^ ' ( / ) ] ( 1  -  < l > i K ) )  e "  +  < t ,  \ K ) f  V ) W e ' "  +  r j f ' ( ! ) ,  
ol 
(IV.22) 
av.23) 
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d K  \ n  
(IV.24) 
d H  M = -— = 
o E  
' x - y - '  
\ n) 
a 
(l + £:)lii(2) (IV.25) 
P + 1 fj. = -a + 
C O  
r  
"J 
n  +  
n )  6 n  n  n  In(2) (IV.26) 
PROPOSITION 8 - The proportion of untreated people increases through time. 
PROOF: 
We take the derivative of (IV.26) with respect to time, and equate it to (IV.25): 
A' = P + 1 
C O  
P + 1 
7  
n  
n  +  \  {-^
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Note that the first term is identical to the expression on the RHS of equations 
(IV.8), and (IV. 16) in the certainty cases. In this case, however, if r = 0, we have that 
i- >0, since we can rewrite (IV.27) as (- C O  n K ) f U )  p + 1 
2 (- n + l J n  
re", and 
//, the shadow value of susceptibility, is positive. The presence of uncertainty modifies 
a result that held for both the certainty cases. Since the date of discovery of an alternative 
technology is now unpredictable, the use of the existing technology is more prudent. 
PROPOSITION 9 - The level of investment increases through time. The increase is 
higher if the discount rate is positive. 
PROOF: 
We take the derivative of (IV.23) with respect to time, and equate it to (rv.24): 
n = 
— r  £^(1-«>(*:))-dSWif- e", and 
( • .  
h = -^ = <P\K)r\^,I,E le"-r'mfiDWe", therefore 
oK yn 
I = [/'(/)r 
r i K )  
g V )  
+ r  
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r i K )  
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+ r 
W 
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(IV.28) 
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Conclusions 
The model's results on use of existing antibiotics are in general extremely robust 
to changes in the specification of the nature of research. They suggest that, no matter 
what the nature of the altemative technology to invest in, the optimal policy would limit 
the increase of people treated with the existing antibiotic. In practice, however, it appears 
that the number of people treated with the existing antibiotics is on the increase, at least 
in Westem countries. This is particularly worrisome in the context of the results of the 
last scenario, that suggest that if the natiu-e of the discovery process is uncertain, the 
number of people treated should be restricted through time, even in the more 
intergenerationally equitable case of a zero discount rate for the future. 
The model also indicates that if the research process is certain, short, high bursts 
of investments might be optimal, while resources invested in R&D should increase 
through time if the discovery process is uncertain. 
According to the American Society for Microbiology, in the mid 1990s, the short 
and medium terms prospects of new drugs' availability were not very good (ASM). More 
recently, the report of the July 1997 workshop of the Forum on Emerging hifections, 
created by a joint initiative of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) states that "Also, 
because general confidence in the existing antibiotic toolkit had muted any sense of 
urgency, there has been a distinct lag in producing new classes of antimicrobials, despite 
great advances in the flmdamental science that is fueling pharmaceutical innovation in 
many other areas. This situation is changing, and the pharmaceutical industry has in the 
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past few years expanded its investment substantially, but public-sector investment awaits 
reinvigoration. What is needed now is sustained, sufficient support—for basic pioneering 
research, for the clinical research required to move truly new products fi-om the 
laboratory to the pharmacy, and for the infrastructure underpinning both" (Harrison and 
Lederberg). This quote suggests research might be underfunded; both the level of 
investment and its time path appear to be suboptimal. 
Linked to the issue of funding is that of the choice of the types of investment. We 
have been implicitly assuming that science determines in each instance the specific natiu^e 
of the investment in which to direct research efforts. The social planner is presented with 
only one type of investment possibility, and can only choose the (continuous) amount of 
resource to devote to it. However, if various choices of investment were possible 
concurrently, the model could still be utilized to determine the optimal combination of 
investments. 
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CHAPTER V. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation examined the economics of resistance management for 
agricultural pesticides and antibiotics, with a particular focus on the common property 
nature of susceptibility and the endogeneity of technological change and their effects on 
the determination of the optimal use of the available biological capital of genetic 
susceptibility. 
Chapter n presented a theoretical model of resistance development with a spatial 
dimension that allowed us to analyze the tradeoffs involved in the use of refuges in 
resistance management strategies. The analysis in Chapter H showed how the presence of 
more than one farmer might impact resistance management strategies based on refuges: 
farmers might either increase or decrease the dose of pesticide but it is in their self 
interest not to plant reflige. This will be true also in the case of a fixed dose. 
The model presented in chapter n also illustrates how the presence of cross-
resistance impacts optimal resistance management strategies by increasing the shadow 
value of susceptibility. The issue of cross resistance is likely to be an important one in 
the future since, as we will see in more detail below, many of the next generation of 
biotechnology products are going to be based on Bt toxins. 
Chapter HI introduced a specific example of the externalities resulting from the 
interaction of space and pest mobility discussed in the introduction of chapter II. The 
results presented in chapter HI illustrate how pest mobility is the key parameter in 
determining the extent of the externalities and the development of resistance in the 
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context of B t  com, and how market penetration and unstructured refuge impact resistance 
buildup. In terms of the optimal pest management strategy, the results of chapter in 
imply that some form of organization or regulation might be necessary only if market 
penetration of Bt crops increases dramatically, and entomologists establish that com 
borers move very little. In general, the analysis presented in chapter III underscores the 
importance of quantifying extemalities. 
Chapter IV explicitly introduced technological change in the analysis. Though 
the analysis refers to the case of antibiotics, the model can be used for pesticides as well. 
The model developed in chapter IV explicitly characterized the common property aspects 
of susceptibility in a dynamic setting and it identified the optimal intertemporal usage 
problem from a social planner perspective. 
The analysis in chapter EI pointed out that, in the case of a fixed dose, the use of 
static refuges is not a first best policy, while the simulation results presented in chapter HI 
illustrate how market penetration impacts the dynamics of resistance development. 
Together, these findings suggest three elements that might be included in the future to 
improve the refiage policy that the EPA mandates for Bt crops. Currently, resistance 
management plans for Bt crops do not take into account the dynamic nature of the 
economics of susceptibility mining, nor do they consider market penetration or low 
compliance to the policy due to the fact that susceptibility is common property. 
Including consideration of these factors is likely to improve the efficacy of the refuge 
policy. The introduction of dynamic refuges, for example, would bring two types of 
benefits: refuge requirements could be revised to take into consideration the level of 
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market penetration, and/or could be adjusted to decrease through time, as susceptibility 
becomes less valuable. 
Indirectly, chapters n and HI point to the importance of backstop technologies. 
The assumption that the time frame of reference is fixed implies that the outcome of 
ongoing research is certain, and that enough resources are being devoted to the 
development of new pesticides. The introduction of new pesticides in the US market has 
been relatively steady in the last decade (see EPA 1998b, 1998c, 1997, 1996, 1995, 
1994). If historical precedent is of any guidance, the availability of alternative 
technologies is not likely to be an issue for US agriculture. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that susceptibility to existing pesticides is going to become obsolete. 
For example, over 10 percent of the 122 new pesticides registered in the US since 1994 
are Bt products, either in spray form or plant-pesticides. Moreover, the EPA is in the 
process of approving or has already approved several new ^r-based bioengineered 
products: nine out of the 12 experimental use permits that the EPA granted in the year 
2000 are for Bt toxins (EPA 2000). 
The framework developed in chapter IV connects the issue of the discovery of 
backstop technologies — be they novel technologies or improvements of existing ones -
with the socially optimal use of the resources we akeady have at our disposal. The model 
presented in chapter IV allows the identification of the time path of optimal number of 
people to treat through time while susceptibility to an existing antibiotic is positive, that 
is, it lets us specify the elements important to the trade-off between present and future use 
of a drug. The results presented in chapter IV suggest that the first best policy is to 
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restrict the increase of the number of people treated with available drugs, particularly if 
the discovery process for new pharmaceutical products is uncertain. 
The second issue that the model developed in chapter IV focuses on is the 
allocation of resources for the development of new pharmaceutical products. The results 
indicate that the time path of investment will depend on the nature of technological 
change. If the discovery process is uncertain, it is optimal to increase the amount of 
resources invested in R&D through time. 
These results have two types of policy implications. In terms of existing 
antibiotics, they point out that the study and implementation of mechanisms to contain 
the number of antibiotic prescriptions should be stepped up. The problem of over-
prescription is even more dramatic in developing countries, since there antibiotics are 
available over the counter, and agents save by not completing antibiotic cycles. 
In terms of research investment, these results indicate the importance of 
instruments that might increase the industry's development of new products. Also, the 
analysis presented indirectly points to the necessity for a clearer definition of the role of 
public vs. private investment in basic medical research and in drug development, 
particularly for diseases like tuberculosis and malaria, since they affect predominantly 
developing countries, and are less likely to attract private resources. 
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APPENDIX 
THE TIME PATH OF REFUGE 
We differentiate the first order condition (11.30) with respect to time: 
0 = { D " [ \  -  u { S ) k { T ) ] P k \ T ) u i S )  D ' k \ r ) u { S ) } P  
+  { - £ ) "[Pk '(r)M(5)]' +D'Pk'\r)uiS) - pfi.it)h{S)r "(r)| r 
+ [-D"P-k{T)k\T)U{S)U\S) ^ D'PK'{T)U'(5)}S-Q„ r-PN,{1)6PK"(r)M(5)r 
-p p, {T)epk\T)U{S) - PP, {t)ek \T)U{S) p- PP, (t)0Pk XT)U '(S) S 
- P P .  ( O K S Y  "(r )  -  pp ,  { t ) H  ' { S ) r  \T ) ' S .  
We then substitute (11.31) and (11.32) into the expression above to get: 
[ D " [ P k • ( T M S ) F  - D ' P k " ( T M S )  +  q „ + p p , i t ) e P k "(r)M(5) + pp,{.t)h{ S )r"(r)}r 
= [D "[1 - u{S)k{T)]Pk\T)U{S) + D'k'(TMS) - pp{T)ek•(r)M(5)}0P[\ - M(5)/t(r)] 
- { - D  P ' - k i r ) k • ( T ) u ( S ) u  ' ( S )  +  D ' P k \ T ) u  \ S )  -  p p { 1 ) 6 P k \ z ) u ' ( 5 )  -  p p ^ { t ) h  ' { S ) r  ' ( r ) } h { S ) r { T )  
- p  { - D '  P u  ' { S ) k { T )  +  p p O P u  \ S ) k { T )  +  p p , h  \ S ) r { T ) ] h { S ) r ' { T )  
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The LHS of this expression is positive. The RHS can be rewritten as: 
1 1 0  
D" e P \ \ -u{ S )k{T) f k \ r )u{ S )  >  0 
+ D  • OPk •(r)M(5)[l - u(S)k(T)][l - p] > 0 
{ t)e' P k  •(r)M(5)[l - M(5)A:(r)](l - p) > 0 
+D " P-k(T)k '(T)u(S)uXS)hiS)r(T) > 0 
+p/i,(/)/z - p) > 0 if A '(5) > 0 
+ D  •  P h { S ) u  \ S )  [ p k { T ) r  '(r) - k  '(r)r(r)] 
-p//, { t ) 9 P u  \ S ) h { S ) [pk{T ) r \T)  -  k •(r)r(r)]. 
If n ^ the last two terms are positive as well. Therefore, r > 0 when 
^  r ( T )  k ( T )  
h \ S ) > 0 :  the area treated increases (refuge decreases) through time. 
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